Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism

Resource Information

The work Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism represents a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute Library. This resource is a combination of several types including: Work, Language Material, Books.

Label

Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism

Title remainder

the promise and peril of fiscal federalism

Statement of responsibility

Jonathan A. Rodden

Creator

• Rodden, Jonathan

Subject

• Central-local government relations
• Intergovernmental fiscal relations
• Revenue sharing

Language

eng

Summary

As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.--

Member of

• Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Assigning source

Provided by publisher

Cataloging source

UkCbUP

Index

index present

Literary form

non fiction

Nature of contents

dictionaries

Series statement

• Cambridge studies in comparative politics
• Cambridge Social Sciences eBooks