European University Institute Library

The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973, the USSR's military intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, Isabella Ginor ; Gideon Remez

Label
The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973, the USSR's military intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, Isabella Ginor ; Gideon Remez
Language
eng
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 361-483) and index
Illustrations
maps
Index
index present
Literary Form
non fiction
Main title
The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973
Nature of contents
bibliography
Oclc number
970609984
Responsibility statement
Isabella Ginor ; Gideon Remez
Sub title
the USSR's military intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict
Summary
Russia's forceful re-entry into the Middle Eastern arena, and the accentuated continuity of Soviet policy and methods of the 1960s and '70s, highlight the topicality of this groundbreaking study, which confirms the USSR's role in shaping Middle Eastern and global history. This book covers the peak of the USSR's direct military involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. The head-on clash between US-armed Israeli forces and some 20,000 Soviet servicemen with state-of-the-art weaponry turned the Middle East into the hottest front of the Cold War. The Soviets' success in this war of attrition paved the way for their planning and support of Egypt's cross-canal offensive in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ginor and Remez challenge a series of long-accepted notions as to the scope, timeline and character of the Soviet intervention and overturn the conventional view that détente with the US induced Moscow to restrainthat a US-Moscow détente led to a curtailment of Egyptian ambitions to recapture of the land it lost to Israel in 1967. Between this analytical rethink and the introduction of an entirely new genre of sources-- -memoirs and other publications by Soviet veterans themselves---The Soviet-Israeli War paves the way for scholars to revisit this pivotal moment in world history. --, Provided by publisher
Table Of Contents
Part 1. "We will not leave Egypt in the lurch" -- Rescuing and rearming the USSR's Allies in June 1967 -- Holding the line on the Suez Canal -- The Soviet presence is formalized and expanded -- Part 2. Operation Kavkaz -- Framing the cross-canal goal and the attrition strategy -- The nuclear non-issue -- "Yellow Arab helmet, blue Russian eyes" -- Facing the Bar-Lev line -- A new phase from March '69? -- What triggered Kavkaz? Refuting Heikal's version -- Dr Chazov's "Vacation in Egypt" -- The Soviet regulars move in -- Operation Kavkaz is formally organized -- The Soviet-Israeli battle is joined -- "A famous indiscretion" as the air war peaks -- An MIA mystery and Soviet intelligence methods -- SAM successes and a MiG debacle -- Ceasefire violation seals a strategic gain -- Part 3. A deceptive end -- Sadat proves his stability and loyalty -- Return of the foxbats -- Trial balloons from both sides -- Flexing muscles while offering a pullback -- Jockeying and posturing -- The deal at the summit and the "expulsion" myth -- Withdrawn regulars conceal "banished" advisers -- Deception-on-Nile, July 1972 -- The Soviets "return" in October -- Part 4. "We prepared the war" -- "We can't control the Arabs but must support them" -- "We will be two Ismails" -- The ultimate test of Ashraf Marwan -- In the thick of the Yom Kippur War -- The Soviet nuclear threat and Kissinger's Defcon-3 -- Epilogue: so what went wrong, and when?
resource.variantTitle
Soviet-Israeli War nineteen sixty-seven to nineteen seventy-three
Content
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