European University Institute Library

Legislative institutions and lawmaking in Latin America, edited by Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis

eng

Includes bibliographical references and index

charts

index present

non fiction

Legislative institutions and lawmaking in Latin America

bibliography

953825052

edited by Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis

Oxford studies in democratization

In this volume, twelve experts on Latin American politics investigate the ways in which the interaction between legislative institutions and the policy positions of key actors affects the initiation and passage of legislation, covering seven Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. These seven presidential systems vary widely in terms of their legislative institutions and the position of relevant actors. The introduction provides a framework to understand the interaction of legislative majorities, political institutions, and policy position, and each chapter begins with a description of the constitutional and congressional rules that allocate powers to propose, amend, and veto legislation. The authors then identify the political actors who have these prerogatives and apply the framework to show how their policy positions and relative strengths influence legislative decision-making. The findings are consistent with the basic argument of the book that presidents with extensive legislative powers may be constrained by the positions of their legislative allies, whereas weaker presidents may be well-positioned to build successful coalitions to achieve their legislative goals. The essays in this volume demonstrate that institutional design, which determines the allocation of legislative powers, must be considered along with the policy preferences of key legislative actors in order to construct a full picture of law-making.--, Provided by Publisher

1: Introduction: Legislative Institutions and Agenda Setting, Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis 2: Presidential Agenda Authority in Plurality-Led Congresses: Agenda Setting Prerogatives without Majority Support, Ernesto Calvo and Iñaki Sagarzazu 3: Agenda Setting and Gridlock in a Multiparty Coalitional Presidential System: The Case of Brazil, Taeko Hiroi and Lucio R. Rennó 4: Presidential Power, Legislative Rules, and Lawmaking in Chile, Eduardo Alemán and Patricio Navia 5: The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Coalitions in Colombia, Royce Carroll and Mónica Pachón 6: Parliamentary Agenda-Setting in Latin America: The Case of Mexico, María Amparo Casar 7: Strong Presidents, Weak Parties, and Agenda Setting: Lawmaking in Democratic Peru, Aldo F. Ponce 8: Agenda Setting and Lawmaking in Uruguay, Daniel Chasquetti 9: Conclusions, Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis