Label
Samuelson, Larry, 1953-
Actions
Incoming Resources
- An extension of the "folk theorem" with continuous reaction functions
- Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions
- Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be
- Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games
- Musical chairs, modeling noisy evolution
- Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- Learning to be imperfect, the ultimatum game
- Endogenous inequality in integrated labor markets with two-sided search
- Muddling through, noisy equilibrium selection
- Extensive form reasoning in normal form games
- Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices
- Muddling through, noisy equilibrium selection
- Repeated games and reputations, long-run relationships, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Analogies and theories, formal models of reasoning, Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler
- Hard bargains and lost opportunities
- Learning to be imperfect, the ultimatum game
- Correlated equilibria and local interactions
- Learning to signal in markets
- Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria
- Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon equilibria
- Hard bargains and lost opportunities
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- Musical chairs, modelling noisy evolution
- Normal form structures in extensive form games
- Who wants a good reputation?
- Structural indifference in normal form games
- Altruists, egoists and hooligans in a local interaction model
- Evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection
- Muddling through, noisy equilibrium selection
- Analogies and theories, formal models of reasoning, Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Strategic information manipulation in duopolies
- Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- Sunk investments lead to unpredictable price, second version
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signalling markets
- Altruists, egoists and hooligans in a local interaction model
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata