Weibull, Jörgen W
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- Contributor of17
- Noncooperative flexible pricing in a homogeneous market
- Social norms, the welfare state and voting
- Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation
- Political equilibrium in representative democracy
- Evolutionary selection and rational behavior
- Debt-financed transfers, public consumption and public investment in an open economy
- Evolution and refinement with endogenous mistake probabilities
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- The normal state of the market in a shortage economy, a queue model
- Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
- Social norms and welfare state dynamics
- Evolution with mutations driven by control costs
- Welfare effects of alternative forms of public spending
- Bounds on optimal linear income taxes
- Evolutionary selection dynamics and irrational survivors
- Balanced-budget redistribution as political equilibrium
- Efficient income taxation in steady state
- Creator of8
- A new self-enforcement criterion for extensive-form games
- On self enforcement in extensive-form games
- Evolutionary game theory, Jörgen W. Weibull
- Persistent unemployment as subgame perfect equilibrium
- A note on the continuity of incentive schedules
- Interpersonal consistency of beliefs in extensive-form games
- On the continuity of optimal income-tax schedules
- Evolutionary game theory, Jörgen W. Weibull