Label
Mailath, George Joseph
Name
Mailath, George Joseph
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Incoming Resources
- Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria
- Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon equilibria
- The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners dilemma
- Correlated equilibria and local interactions
- Endogenous inequality in integrated labor markets with two-sided search
- The incentive costs of internalizing externalities
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Extensive form reasoning in normal form games
- Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, notes on a coordination perspective
- Social assets
- Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices
- Repeated games and reputations, long-run relationships, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, notes on a coordination perspective
- Normal form structures in extensive form games
- Do people play Nash equilibrium?, lessons from evolutionary game theory
- The social context of economic decisions
- Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
- Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics
- Structural indifference in normal form games
- Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be
- Who wants a good reputation?
- Modeling strategic behavior, a graduate introduction to game theory and mechanism design, George J Mailath
- Sunk investments lead to unpredictable price, second version
- Private strategies in finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
- Market selection and asymmetric information
- JET Symposium on evolutionary game theory, introduction
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?