Explaining political leadership : the role of Germany and the EU institutions in Eurozone crisis management

Resource Information

The work Explaining political leadership : the role of Germany and the EU institutions in Eurozone crisis management represents a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute Library. This resource is a combination of several types including: Work, Language Material, Books.

Label

Explaining political leadership : the role of Germany and the EU institutions in Eurozone crisis management

Title remainder

the role of Germany and the EU institutions in Eurozone crisis management

Statement of responsibility

Magnus Gregor Schoeller

Creator

• Schoeller, Magnus Gregor

Contributor

• European University Institute, Department of Political and Social Sciences

Subject

• Financial crises -- European Union countries
• Germany -- Foreign relations -- 21st century
• European Union countries -- Economic policy
• Germany -- Politics and government -- 21st century

Language

eng

Summary

Why and how do composite actors such as states or international institutions emerge as political leaders? Moreover, once in charge, how do they influence policy or institutional change? What are the conditions for successful leadership? These questions become particularly relevant in times of crisis. However, there is no political science theory that explains the emergence and the impact of leadership when exercised by composite actors. In the context of the Eurozone crisis, we observe that neither Germany, which is the actor most frequently called upon to assume leadership, nor any of the EU’s institutional actors have emerged as leader under all circumstances. Instead, we find three different outcomes: no leadership, failed leadership, and successful leadership. This thesis develops a theoretical model to explain this variation and to address the stated gap in the literature. Building on rational-institutionalist assumptions, it argues that leaders can help a group to enhance collective action when there are no, or only incomplete, institutional rules to do so. Thus, especially in times of crisis, leaders can act as drivers of policy or institutional change. However, they emerge only if the expected benefits of leading exceed the costs of it, and if the potential followers suffer high status quo costs. A leader’s impact on the outcomes, by contrast, depends on its power resources, the distribution of preferences, and the institutional constraint. The model is applied to Germany’s role in the first financial assistance to Greece, the proposal to establish a so-called ‘super-commissioner’, and the shaping of the Fiscal Compact. Moreover, the attitude of the European Commission and the European Parliament towards the issue of Eurobonds as well as the European Central Bank’s launch of the Outright Monetary Transactions are analysed on the basis of congruence tests and rigorous process-tracing. These within-case analyses are complemented by a cross-case comparison in order to enhance the external validity of the results. The analysis draws on 35 semi-structured élite interviews conducted at the German Ministry of Finance, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, and two Permanent Representations in Brussels

Member of

• EUI PhD theses

Cataloging source

FIE

Date time place

Defence date: 17 October 2016

Dewey number

332.494

Dissertation note

Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (SPS), 2016

Index

no index present

Literary form

non fiction

Nature of contents

theses

Series statement

• EUI PhD theses
• EUI theses