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The Resource Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism, Jonathan A. Rodden, (electronic resource)

Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism, Jonathan A. Rodden, (electronic resource)

Creator
Summary
As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.--
Language
eng
Work
Publication
Extent
1 online resource (xvi, 313 pages)
Contents
  • Introduction and overview
  • Promise and peril : intellectual history
  • Sovereignty and commitment
  • The power of the purse : intergovernmental grants and fiscal discipline
  • Disease or cure? : political parties and fiscal discipline
  • An approach to comparative case studies
  • Fiscal federalism and bailouts in postwar Germany
  • The crisis of fiscal federalism in Brazil
  • The challenge of reform in federations
  • The origins of subnational sovereignty
  • Conclusions
Isbn
9780521842693
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616075
Instance
Label
Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism
Title
Hamilton's paradox
Title remainder
the promise and peril of fiscal federalism
Statement of responsibility
Jonathan A. Rodden
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
UkCbUP
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Rodden, Jonathan
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Series statement
  • Cambridge studies in comparative politics
  • Cambridge Social Sciences eBooks
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Intergovernmental fiscal relations
  • Central-local government relations
  • Revenue sharing
Label
Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism, Jonathan A. Rodden, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616075
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Introduction and overview -- Promise and peril : intellectual history -- Sovereignty and commitment -- The power of the purse : intergovernmental grants and fiscal discipline -- Disease or cure? : political parties and fiscal discipline -- An approach to comparative case studies -- Fiscal federalism and bailouts in postwar Germany -- The crisis of fiscal federalism in Brazil -- The challenge of reform in federations -- The origins of subnational sovereignty -- Conclusions
Control code
CR9780511616075
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xvi, 313 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780521842693
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)252507929
Label
Hamilton's paradox : the promise and peril of fiscal federalism, Jonathan A. Rodden, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616075
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Introduction and overview -- Promise and peril : intellectual history -- Sovereignty and commitment -- The power of the purse : intergovernmental grants and fiscal discipline -- Disease or cure? : political parties and fiscal discipline -- An approach to comparative case studies -- Fiscal federalism and bailouts in postwar Germany -- The crisis of fiscal federalism in Brazil -- The challenge of reform in federations -- The origins of subnational sovereignty -- Conclusions
Control code
CR9780511616075
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xvi, 313 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780521842693
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)252507929

Subject

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