Actions
Incoming Resources
- Decentralization, mobility costs and the soft budget constraint
- Block premia in transfer of corporate control
- Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets
- Family firms
- Family firms
- Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection
- Large shareholders, monitoring and the value of the firm
- Block premia in transfers of corporate control
- Agency conflicts, ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection
- Tender offers and leverage
- Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders
- Family firms
- Decisions, games, and markets, edited by Pierpaolo Battigalli, Aldo Montesano, Fausto Panunzi
- Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentive in internal capital markets
- Strategic experimentation, the case of poisson bandits
- Family firms
- Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets
- Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders, tender offers when dilution is endogenous