Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W
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- Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact :bgrand design or internal adjustment?
- The European Central Bank, credibility, transparency, and centralization, Jakob de Haan, Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, and Sandra Waller
- Incentive contracts for central bankers under uncertainty, Walsh-Svensson non-equivalence revisited
- Financial integration in Europe, evidence from Euler equation tests
- International financial integration, edited by Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger and Jan J.G. Lemmen
- Daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions and the conditional variance tale in DM/dollar-returns
- Positive political economy, theory and evidence, edited by Sylvester Eijffinger and Harry Huizinga
- Incentive schemes for central bankers under uncertainty, inflation targets versus contracts
- Accounting for daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention, a friction model with a GARCH application
- The quantity approach to financial integration, the Feldstein-Horioka criterion revisited
- Daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve interventions, do they affect the level and unexpected volatility of the DM/dollar-rate?
- Fiscal policy imbalances, the monetary transmission mechanism and prudential supervision, issues facing Europe's central bankers ; papers of an international conference organised by CEPR/European Summer Institute, Lisbon, 17-18 September 1999, ed. by Sylvester Eijffinger
- Should monetary policy be adjusted frequently?
- Central bank independence, an update of theory and evidence
- Frontiers in pension finance, edited by Dirk Broeders, Sylvester Eijffinger, and Aerdt Houben
- Revisiting the stability and growth pact, grand design or internal adjustment?
- Independent central banks and economic performance, edited by Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger
- The fundamental determinants of financial integration in the European Union
- The effectiveness of structural policy in the European union, an empirical analysis for the EU-15 during the period 1995-2001
- Accountability of central banks, aspects and quantification
- The ineffectiveness of central bank intervention
- The price approach to financial integration, decomposing European money market interest rate diferentials
- Central bank independence, an update of theory and evidence
- EU economic governance and globalization, edited by Miriam L. Campanella, Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger
- Creator of34
- The feasible gains from international risk sharing
- A theory of interest rate stepping, inflation-targeting in a dynamic menu cost model
- Central bank independence, a paneldata approach
- A theory of interest rate stepping, inflation targeting in a dynamic menu cost model
- Taxation if capital is not perfectly mobile, tax competition versus tax exportation
- The term structure of interest rates and inflation forecast targeting
- The advantage of hiding both hands, foreign exchange intervention, ambiguity and private information
- Central bank independence, a sensitivity analysis
- The catching up of European money markets, the degree vs the speed of integration
- The ultimatum determinants of central bank independence
- Taxation if capital is not perfectly mobile, tax competition versus tax exportation
- Central bank independence, theory and evidence
- Optimal commitment in an open economy, credibility vs flexibility
- European monetary and fiscal policy, Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger and Jakob de Haan
- The federal design of a Central Bank in a Monetary Union, the case of the European System of Central Banks
- Short-term and long-term government debt and non-resident interest withholding taxes
- Optimal conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) model, a graphical and closed-form solution
- The feasible gains from internation risk sharing
- Short-term and long-term government debt and nonresident interest withholding taxes
- Central bank independence in another eleven countries
- The political economy of central-bank independence
- The term structure of interest rates and inflation forecast targeting
- How transparent are central banks?
- Optimal commitment in an open economy, credibility vs flexibility
- Financial crises, monetary policy and financial fragility, a second-generation model of currency crises
- The political economy of Central Bank independence
- Central bank independence, searching for the philosophers' stone
- Why money talks and wealth whispers, monetary uncertainty and mystique
- The trade off between Central Bank independence and conservativeness
- A theory of Central Bank accountability
- Handbook of central banking, financial regulation and supervision, after the financial crisis, edited by Sylvester Eijffinger, Donato Masciandaro
- Monetary policy and the rule of law
- Flexible inflation targeting under a non-linear Phillips curve
- A theory of central bank accountability
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