European University Institute Library

Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality, Richard Pettigrew

eng

Includes bibliographical references and index

Epistemic risk and the demands of rationality

electronic resource

dictionaries

1341345234

Richard Pettigrew

Oxford scholarship online.

How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James' ideas in 'The Will to Believe', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It's called epistemic utility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism about epistemic rationality: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit.--, Provided by publisher

Abstract -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- I. A PERMISSIVE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY -- 2. Varieties of Permissivism -- 2.1 What Sort of Doxastic State? -- 2.2 Interpersonal or Intrapersonal? -- 2.3 Radical or Not? -- 2.4 Common or Rare? -- 2.5 My Brand of Permissivism -- 3. Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Beliefs -- 4. Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Credences -- 4.1 Measuring the Epistemic Utility of an Individual Credence -- 4.2 Measuring the Epistemic Utility of an Entire Credal State -- 4.3 Why Should Our Measures Be Strictly Proper? -- 5. Foundational Results in Epistemic Utility Theory -- 5.1 Probabilism -- 5.2 The Principal Principle -- 5.3 Plan Conditionalization -- 6. Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors I: The Decision Rule -- 6.1 Risk-Sensitive Decision-Making Under Risk -- 6.1.1 Expected Utility Theory and the Diminishing Marginal Utility of Money -- 6.1.2 Risk-Weighted Expected Utility and the Allais Preferences -- 6.2 Risk-Sensitive Decision-Making Under Uncertainty -- 6.2.1 Subjective Bayesianism -- 6.2.2 Objective Bayesianism -- 6.2.3 Risk-Weighted Subjective Bayesianism -- 6.2.4 Risk-Weighted Objective Bayesianism -- 6.2.5 Wald's Maximin Rule -- 6.2.6 Hurwicz's Criterion of Realism -- 6.2.7 The Generalized Hurwicz Criterion -- 6.3 Characterizing Our Rules -- 6.3.1 The Axioms -- 6.3.2 The Representation Theorems -- 6.4 Appendix: Proofs -- 6.4.1 A Useful Lemma -- 6.4.2 Proof of Theorem 7(i): Characterizing Subjective Bayesianism -- 6.4.3 Proof of Theorem 7(ii): Characterizing Objective Bayesianism -- 6.4.4 Proof of Theorem 7(iii): Characterizing Subjective Risk-Weighted Bayesianism -- 6.4.5 Proof of Theorem 7(iv): Characterizing Objective Risk-Weighted Bayesianism -- 6.4.6 Proof of Theorem 7(vi): Characterizing the Hurwicz Criterion -- 6.4.7 Proof of Theorem 7(v): Characterizing Minimax -- 6.4.8 Proofs of Theorems 7(vii): Characterizing the Generalized Hurwicz Criterion -- 7. Epistemic Risk and Picking Priors II: The Consequences of the Rule -- 7.1 Decomposing Options into Their Component Parts -- 7.2 The Credal Consequences of the Rules -- 7.2.1 The Credal Consequences of the Other Rules -- 7.2.2 The Credal Consequences of GHC -- 7.3 Appendix: Proofs -- 7.3.1 Proof of Theorem 9 -- 8. Epistemic Risk and Picking Posteriors -- 8.1 GHC Forever -- 8.2 Priors and Plans Together -- 8.3 Using Priors to Pick Posteriors -- 8.4 Tying Up Loose Ends -- 8.4.1 Maximizing Expected Epistemic Utility from Whose Point of View? -- 8.4.2 In Favour of Maximizing Expected Utility -- 8.5 Appendix: Proofs -- II. PUT TING THE THEORY TO WORK -- 9. What Is the Value of Rationality? -- 9.1 The Value of Rationality -- 9.2 Deferring to Rationality -- 9.2.1 Levinstein's Deference Argument Against Permissivism -- 9.2.2 Greco and Hedden on the Concept of Rationality -- 9.3 Life on the Edge of Rationality -- 10. Is Brute Shuffling Irrational? -- 11. Priors that Allow You to Learn Inductively -- 12. Clifford's Shipowner, Conspiracy Theories, and Choosing with and for Others -- 12.1 Choosing for Others -- 12.2 Choosing with Others -- 13. Summing Up -- References -- Index