The political economy of trust, institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany, Henry Farrell
Type
Creator
1
Subject
13
- Strategic alliances (Business) -- Germany
- Rational choice theory
- Business networks -- Germany
- Rational choice theory -- Case studies
- Business networks -- Italy -- Case studies
- Packaging machinery industry -- Italy -- Emilia-Romagna
- Business networks -- Italy
- Strategic alliances (Business) -- Italy
- Strategic alliances (Business) -- Germany -- Case studies
- Strategic alliances (Business) -- Italy -- Case studies
- Machine-tool industry -- Germany -- Baden-Württemberg
- Business networks -- Germany -- Case studies
- Mafia -- Italy -- Sicily
Content
1
Is part of
1
Label
The political economy of trust, institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany, Henry Farrell
Language
eng
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Main title
The political economy of trust
Medium
electronic resource
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Oclc number
633342648
Responsibility statement
Henry Farrell
Series statement
Cambridge studies in comparative politicsCambridge Social Sciences eBooks
Sub title
institutions, interests and inter-firm cooperation in Italy and Germany
Summary
Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics - rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about trust's relationship to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how institutions - and in particular informal institutions - can affect trust without reducing it to fully determine expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, and in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, one in Emilia Romagna, Italy, and the other in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust too among Sicilian Mafiosi.--, Provided by publisher
Incoming Resources
- Has instance5