European University Institute Library

Sources of knowledge, on the concept of a rational capacity for knowledge, Andrea Kern ; translated by Daniel Smyth

eng

Includes bibliographical references and index

index present

non fiction

Sources of knowledge

bibliography

946907241

Andrea Kern ; translated by Daniel Smyth

on the concept of a rational capacity for knowledge

How can human beings, who are liable to error, possess knowledge? The skeptic finds this question impossible to answer. If we can err, then it seems the grounds on which we believe do not rule out that we are wrong. Most contemporary epistemologists agree with the skeptic that we can never believe on grounds that exclude error. Sources of Knowledge moves beyond this predicament by demonstrating that some major problems of contemporary philosophy have their roots in the lack of a metaphysical category that is fundamental to our self-understanding: the category of a rational capacity for knowledge. The author argues that we can disarm skeptical doubt by conceiving knowledge as an act of a rational capacity. This enables us to appreciate human fallibility without falling into skepticism, for it allows us to understand how we can form beliefs about the world on grounds that exclude error. Knowledge is a fundamental capacity of the human mind. Human beings, as such, are knowers. In this way, the book seeks to understand knowledge from within our self-understanding as knowers. It develops a metaphysics of the human mind as existing through knowledge of itself, which knowledge--as the human being is finite--takes the form of a capacity. Regaining the concept of a rational capacity for knowledge, Kern makes a powerful and original contribution to philosophy that reinvigorates the tradition of Aristotle and Kant--thinkers whose relevance for contemporary epistemology has yet to be fully appreciated.--, Provided by publisher

Introduction: "But we can always err!" -- Part 1. Knowledge and reason -- I. Finite knowledge -- Who are "we"?: a Kantian answer -- Knowledge from the standpoint of reason -- The dogma: justification without truth -- The puzzle: truth-guaranteeing grounds -- II. Finite justification -- Agrippa's trilemma -- Two answers to Agrippa's trilemma -- The category of a truth-guaranteeing ground -- Are we familiar with grounds belonging to this category? -- The role of perceptual grounds -- Part 2. The primacy of knowledge -- III. Doubting knowledge -- Objectivity and the possibility of error -- The paradox of knowledge -- Is philosophy necessarily skeptical? -- IV. The dilemma of epistemology -- The general redemption strategy: less is more! -- The internalist variant -- The externalist variant -- The paradox returns -- V. What are grounds? -- The rigorous reading: Hume and Kant -- Grounds and facts -- A transcendental argument -- Causality or normativity: a false dichotomy -- The primacy of knowledge -- Part 3. The nature of knowledge -- VI. Rational capacities -- The category of a rational capacity -- Rational capacities as constitutive unities -- Habits and regulative rules -- The normativity of rational capacities -- Aristotle's conception of a dynamis meta logou -- Rational capacities as self-conscious, normative explanations -- VII. Rational capacities for knowledge -- Knowledge as rational capacity -- Knowledge of the explanation of knowledge -- Knowledge as self-conscious actualization of a norm -- Knowledge and non-accidentality -- VIII. Rational capacities and circumstances -- The asymmetry of knowledge and error -- Favorable and unfavorable circumstances -- Fallible capacities and knowledge -- Doxastic responsibility and knowledge -- Part 4. The teleology of knowledge -- IX. The teleology of capacities -- Virtue epistemology and "epistemic capacities": a critique -- Capacities as a species of teleological causality: a Kantian approach -- Kant's refutation of the idea of an "implanted subjective disposition" -- Knowledge as a self-constituting capacity -- X. Knowledge and practice -- Rational capacities and practice -- How does one acquire a rational capacity fo knowledge? -- Knowledge and objectivity -- Skepticism and philosophy