Actions
Incoming Resources
- Exchange processes, the core and competitive allocations
- Fondements d'economie politique
- Simulating with RICE coalitioonally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem
- The acid rain game as a resource allocation process with an application to the cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia
- Strategically stable cost sharing in an economic-ecological negotiation process
- Transfers to sustain core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- The CORE of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Calcul economique iteratif pour les negociacions internationales sur les pluies acides entre la Finlande, la Russie et l'Estonie
- Contributions to operations research and economics, the twentieth anniversary of CORE, edited by Bernard Cornet and Henry Tulkens
- Economie et federalisme
- International negotiations on ACID rains in Northern Europe, a discrete time iterative process
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Assessing the performance of public sector activities, some recent evidence from the productive efficiency viewpoint
- Limits to climate change
- Transfers to sustain Core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution
- Strategic use of tax rates and credits in a model of international corporate income tax competition
- Side payments and international cooperation in a regionalised integrated assessment model for climate change
- Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for climate change problem
- Nonparametric approaches to the assessment of the relative efficiency of bank branches
- Core-theoretic and political stability of international agreements on transfrontier pollution
- A study of cost-efficiency and returns to scale for 235 municipalities in Belgium
- The design of climate policy, edited by Roger Guesnerie and Henry Tulkens
- A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution
- Financial transfers to ensure cooperative international optimality in stock pollutant abatement
- Stabilite strategique et pollution-stock transnationale, le cas lineare
- The Kyoto Protocol, an economic and game theoretic interpretation
- The Performance of public enterprises, concepts and measurement, edited by Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau, and Henry Tulkens
- The Kyoto protocol, an economic and game theoretic interpretation
- Strategically stable cost sharing in an economic-ecological negotiation process
- Optimality properties of alternative systems of taxation of foreign capital income
- On cooperation in Musgravian models of externalities within a federation
- Cooperation vs free riding in international environmental affairs, two approaches
- Non-parametric efficiency, progress and regress measures for panel data, methodological aspects
- On cooperation in musgravian models of externalities within a federation
- Economics, game theory and international environmental agreements, the Ca' Foscari lectures, Henry Tulkens
- Non-frontier measures of efficiency, progress and regress
- Non-parametric efficiency analyses in four service activities, retail banking, municipalities, courts and urban transit
- Co-operation vs free riding in international environmental affairs, two approaches
- Non-parametric efficiency, progress and regress measures for panel data, methodological aspects