Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America

Resource Information

The work Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America represents a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute. This resource is a combination of several types including: Work, Language Material, Books.

Label

Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America

Title remainder

the politics of informal welfare in Latin America

Statement of responsibility

Alisha C. Holland

Creator

• Holland, Alisha

Subject

• Public welfare -- Political aspects -- Latin America
• Latin America -- Social policy
• Public officers -- Latin America
• Latin America -- Politics and government
• Distributive justice -- Political aspects -- Latin America
• Politics, Practical -- Latin America
• Public officers

Language

eng

Summary

• "Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"--
• "The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"--

Member of

• Cambridge studies in comparative politics

Assigning source

• Provided by publisher
• Provided by publisher

Cataloging source

DLC

Illustrations

illustrations

Index

index present

Literary form

non fiction

Nature of contents

bibliography

Series statement

Cambridge studies in comparative politics