European University Institute Library

Simple efficient rank-order contracts under moral hazard and adverse selection

Type

http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Instance

Label

Simple efficient rank-order contracts under moral hazard and adverse selection

System control number

(OCoLC)83861459

Instantiates

Simple efficient rank-order contracts under moral hazard and adverse selection

Carrier category

volume

Media category

unmediated

Publication

Stanford University, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, Stanford, 1990

Incoming Resources

Item of
1
- Simple efficient rank-order contracts under moral hazard and adverse selection

Outgoing Resources

Instantiates
1
- Simple efficient rank-order contracts under moral hazard and adverse selection
Carrier category
1
- volume
Media category
1
- unmediated
Publication
1
- Stanford University, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, Stanford, 1990