Conditionality and coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe

Resource Information

The work Conditionality and coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe represents a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute. This resource is a combination of several types including: Work, Language Material, Books.

Label

Conditionality and coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe

Title remainder

electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe

Statement of responsibility

Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young

Title variation

Electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe

Creator

• Mares, Isabela

Contributor

• Young, Lauren E.

Author

• Young, Lauren E.

Subject

• Romania -- Politics and government -- 1989-
• Elections -- Corrupt practices -- Europe, Eastern
• Hungary -- Politics and government -- 1989-

Language

eng

Summary

In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the "wrong" way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? 'Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe' uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning, including vote buying and electoral coercion, persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate clientelistic strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. We document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. We also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians' personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. --

Member of

• Oxford studies in democratization

Assigning source

Provided by publisher

Illustrations

• illustrations
• maps

Index

index present

Literary form

non fiction

Nature of contents

bibliography

Series statement

Oxford Studies in Democratization

Target audience

adult