European University Institute Library

Truly understood, Christopher Peacocke

eng

Includes bibliographical references (pages [321]-330) and index

illustrations

index present

non fiction

Truly understood

bibliography

173480601

Christopher Peacocke

A, theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The, main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The, first person as a case study -- Fully self-conscious thought -- Immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person -- Can a use of the first-person concept fail to refer? -- Some conceptual roles are distinctive but not fundamental -- Implicit conceptions -- Implicit conceptions : motivation and examples -- Deflationary readings rejected -- The, phenomenon of new principles -- Explanation by implicit conceptions -- Rationalist aspects -- Consequences : rationality, justification, understanding -- Transitional -- Applications to mental concepts -- Conceiving of conscious states -- Understanding and identity in other cases -- Constraints on legitimate explanations in terms of identity -- Why is the subjective case different? -- Attractions of the interlocking account -- Tacit knowledge, and externalism about the internal -- Is this the myth of the given? -- Knowledge of others' conscious states -- Communicability : between Frege and Wittgenstein -- Conclusions and significance -- 'Another I' : representing perception and action -- The, core rule -- Modal status and its significance -- Comparisons -- The, possession-condition and some empirical phenomena -- The, model generalized -- Wider issues -- Mental action -- The, distinctive features of action-awareness -- The, nature and range of mental actions -- The, principal hypothesis and its grounds -- The, principal hypothesis : distinctions and consequences -- How do we know about our own mental actions? -- Concepts of mental actions and their epistemological significance -- Is this account open to the same objections as perceptual models of introspection? -- Characterizing and unifying schizophrenic experience -- The, first person in the self-ascription of action -- Rational agency and action-awareness -- Representing thoughts -- The, puzzle -- A proposal -- How the solution treats the constraints that generate the puzzle -- Relation to single-level treatments -- An application : reconciling externalism with distinctive self-knowledge