Actions
Incoming Resources
- On prize games
- A general class of adaptive strategies
- A reinforcement procedure leading to correlate equilibrium
- A noncooperative interpretation of value and potential
- Potentials and weighted values of non-atomic games
- A general class of adaptive strategies
- Values of perfectly competitive economies
- Efficiency does not imply immediate agreement
- Egalitarian solutions of large games, I a continuum of players
- Significance levels for multiple tests
- Bargaining and value
- A model of n-person non-cooperative bargaining
- 'Knowing whether', 'knowing that' and the cardinality of state spaces
- Simple adaptive strategies, from regret-matching to uncoupled dynamics, Sergiu Hart, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, Andreu Mas-Colell, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona ; with the collaboration of Yakov Babichenko, Amotz Cahn, Yishay Mansour, David Schmeidler
- Harsanyi values of large economies, non-eqivalence to competitive equilibria
- A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium
- Egalitarian solutions of large games, II the asymptotic approach
- Market crashes without external shocks
- Harsanyi values of large economies, non-equivalence to competitive equilibria
- A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium
- Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction