Bibliograph

Analyzing electoral promises with game theory, Yasushi Asako

Type

Label

Analyzing electoral promises with game theory, Yasushi Asako

Language

eng

Bibliography note

Includes bibliographical references and index

Illustrations

illustrations

Index

index present

Literary Form

non fiction

Main title

Analyzing electoral promises with game theory

Nature of contents

bibliography

Oclc number

1202626062

Responsibility statement

Yasushi Asako

Series statement

Routledge focus on economics and finance, [5]

Summary

Electoral promises help to win votes and political candidates, or parties should strategically choose what they can deliver to win an election. Past game-theoretical studies tend to ignore electoral promises and this book sheds illuminating light on the functions and effects of electoral promises on policies or electoral outcomes through game theory models. This book provides a basic framework for game-theoretical analysis of electoral promises. The book also includes cases to illustrate real life applications of these theories. --, Provided by publisher

Table Of Contents

Electoral promises in formal models -- Electoral promises as a commitment device -- Electoral promises as a signal -- Electoral promises with vague words

Creator