European University Institute Library

Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution

Type

Label

Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution

Specific Material Designation

remote

System control number

(OCoLC)1088458902

Instantiates

Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution

Access location

Check for full-text

Carrier category

online resource

Media category

computer

Publication

Universite catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003

Incoming Resources

Item of
1
- Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution

Outgoing Resources

Instantiates
1
- Optimal grants under asymmetric information: federalism versus devolution
Access location
1
- Check for full-text
Carrier category
1
- online resource
Media category
1
- computer
Publication
1
- Universite catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003