Multiethnic coalitions in Africa, business financing of opposition election campaigns, Leonardo R. Arriola
Type
Subject
7
- Campaign funds -- Africa, Sub-Saharan
- Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Politics and government -- 1960-
- Cameroon -- Politics and government
- Opposition (Political science) -- Africa, Sub-Saharan
- Kenya -- Politics and government
- Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Ethnic relations -- Political aspects
- Electoral coalitions -- Africa, Sub-Saharan
Content
1
Is part of
1
Mapped to
1
Label
Multiethnic coalitions in Africa, business financing of opposition election campaigns, Leonardo R. Arriola
Language
eng
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Main title
Multiethnic coalitions in Africa
Medium
electronic resource
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Oclc number
812911579
Responsibility statement
Leonardo R. Arriola
Series statement
Cambridge studies in comparative politicsCambridge Social Sciences eBooks
Sub title
business financing of opposition election campaigns
Summary
Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.--, Provided by publisher
Table of contents
The puzzle of opposition coordination -- A theory of pecuniary coalition formation -- The emergence of financial reprisal regimes -- The political control of banking -- The liberalization of capital -- The political alignment of business -- Opposition bargaining across ethnic cleavages -- Multiethnic opposition coalitions in African elections -- Democratic consolidation in Africa -- Appendix A: Commercial banking sector size and opposition coalitions in Africa -- Appendix B: Sources on commodity exports and ethnic production by country -- Appendix C: Variables: definitions, sources, and summary statistics -- Appendix D: Multiethnic opposition coalitions in Africa, 1990-2005
Incoming Resources
- Has instance3