Planning to fail, the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, James H. Lebovic
Type
Label
Planning to fail, the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, James H. Lebovic
Language
eng
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Index
index present
Literary Form
non fiction
Main title
Planning to fail
Medium
electronic resource
Nature of contents
dictionariesbibliography
Oclc number
1088407668
Responsibility statement
James H. Lebovic
Series statement
Oxford scholarship online.
Sub title
the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
Summary
The US wars in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the US failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the US fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices.--, Provided by publisher
Target audience
specialized
Creator
Subject
Mapped to
Incoming Resources
- Has instance1