Actions
Incoming Resources
- The evolution of algorithmic learning rules, a global stability result
- Incomplete written contracts, undescribable states of nature
- Cooperation and non-halting strategies
- Correctly anticipated bank runs
- Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies
- Some notes on the economics of barter, money and credit
- Costly contingent contracts
- Costly bargaining and renegotiation
- Costly Coasian contracts
- Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?, Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite
- Learning on a Torus
- Path dependence and learning from neighbours
- Incomplete written contracts, endogenous agency problems
- Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution
- Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?
- On autarkic communities and finite no surplus economies
- Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies, Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite
- Forecasting errors and bounded rationality, an example
- Endogenous agency problems
- Central banks and moral hazard
- Active courts and menu contracts, Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, Andrew Postlewaite
- Costly bargaining and renegotiation
- Active courts and menu contracts
- Bounded rationality and incomplete contracts
- Communication, computability and common interest games
- Costly Coasian contracts
- Transaction costs and the robustness of the coase theorem
- Structural stability and robusstness to bounded rationality
- Manager-managed firms
- Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies
- Some notes on Church's thesis and the theory of games
- Courts of law and unforeseen contingencies
- Incomplete written contracts, undescribable states of nature
- Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?
- Should courts always enforce what contracting parties write?
- Costly bargaining and renegotiation