Label
Zeeuw, Aart de, 1952-
Actions
Incoming Resources
- Capital accumulation and entry deterrence, a clarifying note
- Environmental policy in an international duopoly, an analysis of feedback investment strategies
- International aspects of pollution control
- Transfers to sustain core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- Theory of natural exhaustible resources, the Cartel-versus-Fringe model reconsidered
- Investment in clean technology and transboundary pollution control
- Tradeable emission permits in oligopoly
- Dynamic policy games in economics, essays in honour of Piet Verheyen, edited by Frederick van der Ploeg, Aart de Zeeuw
- Strong time-consistency in the Cartel-versus-Fringe model
- Standard versus taxes in a dynamic duopoly model of trade
- Transfers to sustain Core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- Issue linkage in global environmental problems
- Strong time-consistency in the Cartel-versus-Fringe model
- Tradeable emission permits in oligopoly
- Perfect equilibrium in a model of competitive arms accumulation
- Perfect equilibrium in a model of competitive arms accumulation
- Strategic bargaining for the control of a dynamic system in state-space form
- Corporate tax rate policy and public and private employment
- Advanced lectures in quantitative economics, edited by Aart J. de Zeeuw, 2
- Stabilite strategique et pollution-stock transnationale, le cas lineare
- Environmental policy and competitiveness, the porter hypotheisis and the composition of capital
- Critical loads in games of transboundary pollution control