Internal government dynamics and the nature of intergovernmental relations : constraints and corridors of organizational adaptation in federal systems

Resource Information

The work Internal government dynamics and the nature of intergovernmental relations : constraints and corridors of organizational adaptation in federal systems represents a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute. This resource is a combination of several types including: Work, Language Material, Books.

Label

Internal government dynamics and the nature of intergovernmental relations : constraints and corridors of organizational adaptation in federal systems

Title remainder

constraints and corridors of organizational adaptation in federal systems

Statement of responsibility

Nicole Bolleyer

Creator

• Bolleyer, Nicole

Contributor

• European University Institute, Department of Political and Social Sciences

Subject

• Central-local government relations -- Case studies
• Comparative government
• Federal government
• Federal government -- Case studies
• Intergovernmental cooperation
• Intergovernmental cooperation -- Case studies
• Central-local government relations

Genre

• Case studies

Language

eng

Summary

Over the past decades, governments have increasingly been confronted with problems that transcend their boundaries. A multitude of policy fields are affected, including environment, trade and security. Responding to the challenges triggered by Europeanization and globalization, governments increasingly interact across different spheres of authority. Both theoretically and empirically, the puzzle of institutional choice reflected by the variety of arrangements in which intergovernmental cooperation takes place inside individual countries and across their borders remains surprisingly under-explored. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the dissertation tackles the following questions: Why are the intergovernmental arrangements governments set up to deal with boundary-crossing problems so different? To what extent do these institutional differences affect the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation? To address this gap theoretically and empirically, this book adopts a deductive, rationalist approach to institution-building. It argues that internal politics, the type of executive-legislative relations within the interacting governments, explains the nature of institutions set up to channel intergovernmental processes: while power-sharing governments engage in institution-building, power-concentrating governments avoid it. It also shows that these institutional choices matter for the output of intergovernmental cooperation. The approach is applied to Canada, Switzerland, the United States, and finally the European Union. Disaggregating individual government units, the theoretical approach reveals how intragovernmental micro-incentives drive macro-dynamics and thereby addresses the neglect of horizontal dynamics in multilevel systems. The willingness and capacity of lower-level governments to solve collective problems on their own and to oppose central encroachment are crucial to understand the power distribution in different systems and their long-term evolutions

Member of

• EUI PhD theses

Cataloging source

IT-FiEUI

Date time place

Defence date: 7 May 2007

Dissertation note

Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (SPS), 2007.

Illustrations

• charts
• illustrations

Index

no index present

Literary form

non fiction

Nature of contents

theses

Series statement

• EUI PhD theses
• EUI theses