European University Institute Library

Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources, the case of radio spectrum and energy resources, Gonçalo Miguel Banha Coelho

Label
Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources, the case of radio spectrum and energy resources, Gonçalo Miguel Banha Coelho
Language
eng
Abstract
The Thesis analyses the impact of the regulation of radio spectrum and energy resources in the liberalisation of wireless communications and electricity in the European Union (EU). The answer to this inquiry presupposes a discussion of three sub-questions: (i) what is the competence of the EU to regulate energy resources ("the power gap")?; (ii) is there a gap in the regulation of natural resources ("the regulatory gap")?; and (iii) how has the Commission used other instruments, particularly competition law, to bridge the two gaps. The Introduction presents the institutional economics approach that guides the reader throughout the Thesis. It builds upon Williamson's four levels of institutional analysis and argues that the way in which access to natural resources is structured (level 2 of institutional analysis), deeply impacts the regulatory design of the network industries and the way in which the Commission shapes the application of competition law. Its purpose is not to present an ideal system of resource management but rather to highlight that all institutional decisions bear costs, and that, in the absence of level 2 interventions, the Commission has used imperfect alternative solutions, such as competition law, to bridge the regulatory and power gaps. Having laid out an analytical methodology, I move to the specific discussion of radio spectrum (Chapters 1-4) and energy resources (Chapters 5-6). In the two parts of the Thesis I use the U.S. as a benchmark for analysis so as to demonstrate that several institutional solutions are possible: command and control backed-up by public ownership, market mechanisms with private property and commons (the latter is discussed only in relation with wireless communications). Starting with the "power gap", I argue that it does not stem from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Articles 345 and 194(2) TFEU) and that, despite its practical consequences, it has an essentially epistemological nature (Chapters 2 and 5). Chapters 3 and 5 offer a 5 thorough analysis of the EU's attempts to directly regulate radio spectrum and energy resources irrespective of the power gap. The argument put forward is that "level 2" interventions by the EU have been scant and generally ineffective, having therefore contributed to the creation or reinforcement of bottlenecks in wireless communications and electricity. As a result, the Commission has resorted to imperfect alternative institutional solutions, especially competition law in a 'property rights' way that compensates for a perceived lack of powers to regulate natural resources directly. Albeit unorthodox, this approach to the redesign of property rights held by Member States was ratified by the Court of Justice in its Greek Lignites judgment and the subsequent line of argumentation followed up by the Commission in follow-up cases
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-318)
resource.dissertationNote
Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (LAW), 2016.
Index
no index present
Literary Form
non fiction
Main title
Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources
Nature of contents
theses
Oclc number
1088462134
resource.otherEventInformation
Defence date: 9 May 2016
Responsibility statement
Gonçalo Miguel Banha Coelho
Series statement
EUI PhD thesesEUI theses
Sub title
the case of radio spectrum and energy resources
Classification
Is Part Of
Mapped to