Coverart for item
The Resource Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing, Orit Kedar, (electronic resource)

Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing, Orit Kedar, (electronic resource)

Label
Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing
Title
Voting for policy, not parties
Title remainder
how voters compensate for power sharing
Statement of responsibility
Orit Kedar
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies.--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
UkCbUP
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Kedar, Orit
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Series statement
  • Cambridge studies in comparative politics
  • Cambridge Social Sciences eBooks
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Voting
  • Political parties
  • Political planning
  • Representative government and representation
  • Public opinion
  • Comparative government
Label
Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing, Orit Kedar, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511657481
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Voting for policy. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice ; A theory of compensatory vote -- Empirical evidence: how voters compensate for diffusion of power. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies ; Balancing strong (and weak) presidents ; Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany -- Theoretical implications
Control code
CR9780511657481
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 220 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780511657481
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)536174544
Label
Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing, Orit Kedar, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511657481
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Voting for policy. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice ; A theory of compensatory vote -- Empirical evidence: how voters compensate for diffusion of power. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies ; Balancing strong (and weak) presidents ; Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany -- Theoretical implications
Control code
CR9780511657481
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiv, 220 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780511657481
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)536174544

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