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The Resource The politics of IMF lending, Michael Breen

The politics of IMF lending, Michael Breen

Label
The politics of IMF lending
Title
The politics of IMF lending
Statement of responsibility
Michael Breen
Creator
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
DKDLA
http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
1983-
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Breen, Michael
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
Series statement
International Political Economy Series
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • International Monetary Fund
  • International finance
  • International economic relations
Label
The politics of IMF lending, Michael Breen
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 197-213) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
1. Introduction -- I. Theory -- 2. Who controls the IMF? -- 3. Domestic interests and IMF programs -- 4. The impact of the shareholders on IMF programs -- II. Evidence -- 5. Testing the argument -- 6. IMF lending -- 7. IMF lending and the crisis in Europe -- 8. IMF conditionality -- 9. IMF conditionality and the Asian crisis -- III. Implications -- 10. Theory, evidence and reform
Control code
FIEb17727212
Dimensions
23 cm.
Extent
x, 219 pages
Isbn
9781137263803
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
n
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)857383062
Label
The politics of IMF lending, Michael Breen
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 197-213) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
1. Introduction -- I. Theory -- 2. Who controls the IMF? -- 3. Domestic interests and IMF programs -- 4. The impact of the shareholders on IMF programs -- II. Evidence -- 5. Testing the argument -- 6. IMF lending -- 7. IMF lending and the crisis in Europe -- 8. IMF conditionality -- 9. IMF conditionality and the Asian crisis -- III. Implications -- 10. Theory, evidence and reform
Control code
FIEb17727212
Dimensions
23 cm.
Extent
x, 219 pages
Isbn
9781137263803
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
n
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)857383062

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