Coverart for item
The Resource The federal design dilemma : Congress and intergovernmental delegation, Pamela J. Clouser McCann, University of Southern California, (electronic resource)

The federal design dilemma : Congress and intergovernmental delegation, Pamela J. Clouser McCann, University of Southern California, (electronic resource)

Label
The federal design dilemma : Congress and intergovernmental delegation
Title
The federal design dilemma
Title remainder
Congress and intergovernmental delegation
Statement of responsibility
Pamela J. Clouser McCann, University of Southern California
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
"The level of government responsible for implementing policies affects intent, services provided, and ultimate outcomes. The decision about where to locate such responsibility is the federal design dilemma faced by Congress. Taking a new approach to this delegation and decentralization, The Federal Design Dilemma focuses on individual members of Congress. Not only are these legislators elected by constituents from their states, they also consider the outcomes that will result from state-level versus national executive branch implementation of policies. Here, Pamela J. Clouser McCann documents congressional intergovernmental delegation between 1973 and 2010, and how individual legislators voted on decentralization and centralization choices. Clouser McCann traces the path of the Affordable Care Act from legislative proposals in each chamber to its final enactment, focusing on how legislators wrestled with their own intergovernmental context and the federal design of health insurance reform in the face of political challenges"--
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Clouser McCann, Pamela J
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • United States
  • United States.
  • Federal government
  • Central-local government relations
  • Intergovernmental cooperation
  • Decentralization in government
Label
The federal design dilemma : Congress and intergovernmental delegation, Pamela J. Clouser McCann, University of Southern California, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316275085
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Machine generated contents note: 1. The federal design dilemma -- a puzzle of intergovernmental delegation; 2. A theory of federal delegation design; 3. Measuring the federal allocation of authority; 4. Intergovernmental context and congressional coalition formation; 5. Congressional intergovernmental delegation of authority from 1973-2010; 6. Intergovernmental options and the politics of health insurance reform; 7. The intergovernmental context of federal policy design
Control code
CR9781316275085
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xii, 272 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9781107527263
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)957223985
Label
The federal design dilemma : Congress and intergovernmental delegation, Pamela J. Clouser McCann, University of Southern California, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316275085
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Machine generated contents note: 1. The federal design dilemma -- a puzzle of intergovernmental delegation; 2. A theory of federal delegation design; 3. Measuring the federal allocation of authority; 4. Intergovernmental context and congressional coalition formation; 5. Congressional intergovernmental delegation of authority from 1973-2010; 6. Intergovernmental options and the politics of health insurance reform; 7. The intergovernmental context of federal policy design
Control code
CR9781316275085
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xii, 272 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9781107527263
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)957223985

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