Coverart for item
The Resource The economics of contracts : theories and applications, edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant, (electronic resource)

The economics of contracts : theories and applications, edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant, (electronic resource)

Label
The economics of contracts : theories and applications
Title
The economics of contracts
Title remainder
theories and applications
Statement of responsibility
edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant
Contributor
Editor
Subject
Language
  • eng
  • fre
  • eng
Summary
A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this 2002 book provides an overview of developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners.--
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
UkCbUP
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Brousseau, Eric
  • Glachant, Jean-Michel
Series statement
Cambridge Social Sciences eBooks
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
Contracts
Label
The economics of contracts : theories and applications, edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613807
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships
  • Benjamin Klein
  • Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts
  • Eirik G. Furubotn
  • The contract as economic trade
  • Jacques Ghestin
  • Contract theory and theories of contract regulation
  • Alan Schwartz
  • Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law : sale of an asset of uncertain value
  • Victor P. Goldberg
  • The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics
  • A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights
  • Gary D. Libecap
  • Transaction costs and incentive theory
  • Eric Malin and David Martimort
  • Norms and the theory of the firm
  • Oliver Hart
  • Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints
  • Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey
  • Complexity and contract
  • W. Bentley Macleod
  • Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant
  • Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts
  • Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser
  • Positive agency theory : place and contributions
  • Gérard Charreaux
  • Econometrics of contracts : an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting
  • Scott E. Masten and Stéphane Saussier
  • Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing
  • Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger
  • Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts : substitutes or complements?
  • Francine LaFontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud
  • Appendix : Canonical models of theories of contract
  • The quasi-judicial role of large retailers : an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers
  • Benito Arruñada
  • Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks : from strategic behaviors to property rights
  • Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Pénard
  • Licensing in the chemical industry
  • Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri
  • Inter-company agreements and EC competition law
  • Michel Glais
  • Incentive contracts in utility regulation
  • Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price
  • M'Hand Fares
  • Contractual choice and performance : the case of water supply in France
  • Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier
  • Institutional or structural : lessons from international electricity sector reforms --
  • Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller
  • Electricity sector restructuring and competition : a transactions-cost perspective
  • Paul L. Joskow
  • The new institutional economics
  • Ronald Coase
  • Contract and economic organization
  • Oliver E. Williamson
Control code
CR9780511613807
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xvi, 584 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780521814904
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)252484917
Label
The economics of contracts : theories and applications, edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613807
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships
  • Benjamin Klein
  • Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts
  • Eirik G. Furubotn
  • The contract as economic trade
  • Jacques Ghestin
  • Contract theory and theories of contract regulation
  • Alan Schwartz
  • Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law : sale of an asset of uncertain value
  • Victor P. Goldberg
  • The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics
  • A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights
  • Gary D. Libecap
  • Transaction costs and incentive theory
  • Eric Malin and David Martimort
  • Norms and the theory of the firm
  • Oliver Hart
  • Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints
  • Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey
  • Complexity and contract
  • W. Bentley Macleod
  • Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant
  • Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts
  • Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser
  • Positive agency theory : place and contributions
  • Gérard Charreaux
  • Econometrics of contracts : an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting
  • Scott E. Masten and Stéphane Saussier
  • Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing
  • Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger
  • Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts : substitutes or complements?
  • Francine LaFontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud
  • Appendix : Canonical models of theories of contract
  • The quasi-judicial role of large retailers : an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers
  • Benito Arruñada
  • Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks : from strategic behaviors to property rights
  • Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Pénard
  • Licensing in the chemical industry
  • Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri
  • Inter-company agreements and EC competition law
  • Michel Glais
  • Incentive contracts in utility regulation
  • Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price
  • M'Hand Fares
  • Contractual choice and performance : the case of water supply in France
  • Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier
  • Institutional or structural : lessons from international electricity sector reforms --
  • Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller
  • Electricity sector restructuring and competition : a transactions-cost perspective
  • Paul L. Joskow
  • The new institutional economics
  • Ronald Coase
  • Contract and economic organization
  • Oliver E. Williamson
Control code
CR9780511613807
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xvi, 584 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780521814904
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)252484917

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