The Resource Taming regulatory competition : interest groups v. joint-decision trap : four EU policy cases on workers mobility, Alexis Lubow

Taming regulatory competition : interest groups v. joint-decision trap : four EU policy cases on workers mobility, Alexis Lubow

Label
Taming regulatory competition : interest groups v. joint-decision trap : four EU policy cases on workers mobility
Title
Taming regulatory competition
Title remainder
interest groups v. joint-decision trap : four EU policy cases on workers mobility
Statement of responsibility
Alexis Lubow
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Worker migration across EU member states’ borders constitutes an increasingly salient issue. Unlike the liberalization of trade in goods, it has spilled into other policy areas in many unexpected ways. It contributed to turning the so-called Bolkestein Directive on services into a highly-politicized policymaking episode. Subsequent decisions adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have only aggravated looming conflicts between high- and low-standard countries, new and old member states, competing social partners and political parties within the European Parliament. Policy issues that are resolutely foreign to EU competences, like the right to strike, have been affected as well. Simply put, recent policy developments about worker migration illustrate the increasingly contested nature of European integration. In that context, decision makers are trapped into a prisoner’s dilemma that is a real or perceived risk arising from regulatory competition. Hence, member states’ preference heterogeneity translates into an amplified risk of policymaking deadlock. Therefore, the question that this dissertation aims to answer is: under which conditions can EU institutions collectively negotiate positive policy solutions in the context of regulatory competition? Taken in isolation, a change in member state’s bargaining attitudes is unlikely and puzzling. Instead, I argue that when there is a high risk of deadlock in the Council the successful negotiation of policy instruments depends significantly on the relative homogeneity of preferences of competing social partners and their ability to defend pan-European interests next to national immediate interests. The empirical analysis examines four cases of policy negotiations in relation to worker mobility within the EU. Negotiations over the 2006 Services Directive are sliced into two distinct strategic interactions. In addition, I examine the failed negotiations over the 2012 Monti II Proposal on the right to take collective action and the successful negotiations over the 2014 Directive on the enforcement of the 1996 Posted Worker Directive. The selection of cases aims to carry out a conceptual experiment in which the strategic setting is maintained relatively constant while variations in actors’ preferences and strategies may affect policy outputs
Cataloging source
FIE
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Lubow, Alexis
Date time place
Defence date: 18 May 2017
Dewey number
320.6094
Dissertation note
Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (SPS), 2017
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
theses
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
European University Institute
Series statement
  • EUI PhD theses.
  • EUI theses
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Labor mobility
  • Occupational mobility
  • Labor market
  • Labor laws and legislation
  • Labor policy
Label
Taming regulatory competition : interest groups v. joint-decision trap : four EU policy cases on workers mobility, Alexis Lubow
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/46447
Instantiates
Publication
Note
Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor); Professor László Bruszt, European University Institute; Professor Pieter Bouwen, University of Leuven; Professor Susanne K. Schmidt, University of Bremen
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 270-290)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Control code
FIE
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
vi, 290 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
System control number
(OCoLC)1088502489
Label
Taming regulatory competition : interest groups v. joint-decision trap : four EU policy cases on workers mobility, Alexis Lubow
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/46447
Publication
Note
Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor); Professor László Bruszt, European University Institute; Professor Pieter Bouwen, University of Leuven; Professor Susanne K. Schmidt, University of Bremen
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 270-290)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Control code
FIE
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
vi, 290 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
System control number
(OCoLC)1088502489

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