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The Resource Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups : A Game Theoretic Approach, by Nina Ismael, (electronic resource)

Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups : A Game Theoretic Approach, by Nina Ismael, (electronic resource)

Label
Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups : A Game Theoretic Approach
Title
Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups
Title remainder
A Game Theoretic Approach
Statement of responsibility
by Nina Ismael
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This book applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism and investigates how the competition for support can influence the attack behavior of terror organizations. In addition, it examines the economics of terrorism. The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence. Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars working in the fields of economics, politics, the social sciences, and military history, as well as military and political decision-makers and authorities working in the field of risk management.--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Ismael, Nina
Image bit depth
0
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Series statement
  • SpringerBriefs in Economics,
  • Springer eBooks.
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Economic theory
  • Terrorism
  • Political violence
Label
Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups : A Game Theoretic Approach, by Nina Ismael, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
mixed
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
not applicable
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Introduction -- On Terrorism -- Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare -- The Economics of Terrorism -- Competition Between Homogeneous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model -- Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State -- Conclusion
Control code
978-3-030-51307-8
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
1st ed. 2020.
Extent
1 online resource
File format
multiple file formats
Form of item
  • online
  • electronic
Isbn
9783030513078
Level of compression
uncompressed
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Quality assurance targets
absent
Reformatting quality
access
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1226245706
Label
Strategic Interaction Between Islamist Terror Groups : A Game Theoretic Approach, by Nina Ismael, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8
Publication
Antecedent source
mixed
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
not applicable
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Introduction -- On Terrorism -- Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare -- The Economics of Terrorism -- Competition Between Homogeneous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model -- Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State -- Conclusion
Control code
978-3-030-51307-8
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
1st ed. 2020.
Extent
1 online resource
File format
multiple file formats
Form of item
  • online
  • electronic
Isbn
9783030513078
Level of compression
uncompressed
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Quality assurance targets
absent
Reformatting quality
access
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1226245706

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