Coverart for item
The Resource Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it, edited by Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University, (electronic resource)

Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it, edited by Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University, (electronic resource)

Label
Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it
Title
Preventing regulatory capture
Title remainder
special interest influence and how to limit it
Statement of responsibility
edited by Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University
Contributor
Editor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
When regulations (or lack thereof) seem to detract from the common good, critics often point to regulatory capture as a culprit. In some academic and policy circles it seems to have assumed the status of an immutable law. Yet for all the ink spilled describing and decrying capture, the concept remains difficult to nail down in practice. Is capture truly as powerful and unpreventable as the informed consensus seems to suggest? This edited volume brings together seventeen scholars from across the social sciences to address this question. Their work shows that capture is often misdiagnosed and may in fact be preventable and manageable. Focusing on the goal of prevention, the volume advances a more rigorous and empirical standard for diagnosing and measuring capture, paving the way for new lines of academic inquiry and more precise and nuanced reform.--
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
UkCbUP
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
  • 1967-
  • 1964-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Carpenter, Daniel P.
  • Moss, David A.
Series statement
Cambridge Social Sciences eBooks
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Deregulation
  • Trade regulation
  • Pressure groups
Label
Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it, edited by Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565875
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Acknowledgements -- Contributors -- Preface -- Introduction / Daniel Carpenter and David Moss -- Failures of capture scholarship -- A revisionist history of regulatory capture / William Novak -- The concept of regulatory capture : a short, inglorious history / Richard Posner -- Detecting and measuring capture / Daniel Carpenter -- New conceptions of capture : mechanisms and outcomes -- Cultural capture and the financial crisis / James Kwak -- Complexity, capacity, and capture / Nolan McCarty -- Preventing economists' capture / Luigi Zingales -- Corrosive capture? : the dueling forces of autonomy and industry influence in FDA pharmaceutical regulation / Daniel Carpenter -- Misdiagnosing capture and case studies of regulatory success -- Capturing history : the case of the federal radio commission in 1927 / David Moss and Jonathan Lackow -- Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture : evidence from coal mine safety regulation / Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer -- Captured by disaster? : reinterpreting regulatory behavior in the shadow of the Gulf oil spill / Christopher Carrigan -- Reconsidering agency capture during regulatory policymaking / Susan Webb Yackee -- Coalitions, autonomy, and regulatory bargains in public health law / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- The possibility of preventing capture -- Preventing capture through consumer empowerment programs : some evidence from insurance regulation / Daniel Schwarcz -- Courts and regulatory capture / M. Elizabeth Magill -- Can executive review help prevent capture? / Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore -- Conclusion / David Moss and Daniel Carpenter -- Afterword / Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and Jim Leach, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities
Control code
CR9781139565875
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xxv, 501 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9781107036086
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)881237482
Label
Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it, edited by Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565875
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Acknowledgements -- Contributors -- Preface -- Introduction / Daniel Carpenter and David Moss -- Failures of capture scholarship -- A revisionist history of regulatory capture / William Novak -- The concept of regulatory capture : a short, inglorious history / Richard Posner -- Detecting and measuring capture / Daniel Carpenter -- New conceptions of capture : mechanisms and outcomes -- Cultural capture and the financial crisis / James Kwak -- Complexity, capacity, and capture / Nolan McCarty -- Preventing economists' capture / Luigi Zingales -- Corrosive capture? : the dueling forces of autonomy and industry influence in FDA pharmaceutical regulation / Daniel Carpenter -- Misdiagnosing capture and case studies of regulatory success -- Capturing history : the case of the federal radio commission in 1927 / David Moss and Jonathan Lackow -- Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture : evidence from coal mine safety regulation / Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer -- Captured by disaster? : reinterpreting regulatory behavior in the shadow of the Gulf oil spill / Christopher Carrigan -- Reconsidering agency capture during regulatory policymaking / Susan Webb Yackee -- Coalitions, autonomy, and regulatory bargains in public health law / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- The possibility of preventing capture -- Preventing capture through consumer empowerment programs : some evidence from insurance regulation / Daniel Schwarcz -- Courts and regulatory capture / M. Elizabeth Magill -- Can executive review help prevent capture? / Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore -- Conclusion / David Moss and Daniel Carpenter -- Afterword / Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and Jim Leach, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities
Control code
CR9781139565875
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xxv, 501 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9781107036086
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)881237482

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