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The Resource Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it, [edited by] Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University

Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it, [edited by] Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University

Label
Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it
Title
Preventing regulatory capture
Title remainder
special interest influence and how to limit it
Statement of responsibility
[edited by] Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University
Creator
Contributor
Editor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
When regulations (or lack thereof) seem to detract from the common good, critics often point to regulatory capture as a culprit. In some academic and policy circles it seems to have assumed the status of an immutable law. Yet for all the ink spilled describing and decrying capture, the concept remains difficult to nail down in practice. Is capture truly as powerful and unpreventable as the informed consensus seems to suggest? This edited volume brings together seventeen scholars from across the social sciences to address this question. Their work shows that capture is often misdiagnosed and may in fact be preventable and manageable. Focusing on the goal of prevention, the volume advances a more rigorous and empirical standard for diagnosing and measuring capture, paving the way for new lines of academic inquiry and more precise and nuanced reform --
Assigning source
Provided by Publisher
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
1967-
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Carpenter, Daniel P.
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1964-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Moss, David A.
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Deregulation
  • Trade regulation
  • Pressure groups
Label
Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it, [edited by] Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University
Instantiates
Publication
Note
Includes index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
Acknowledgements -- Contributors -- Preface -- Introduction / Daniel Carpenter and David Moss -- Failures of capture scholarship -- A revisionist history of regulatory capture / William Novak -- The concept of regulatory capture : a short, inglorious history / Richard Posner -- Detecting and measuring capture / Daniel Carpenter -- New conceptions of capture : mechanisms and outcomes -- Cultural capture and the financial crisis / James Kwak -- Complexity, capacity, and capture / Nolan McCarty -- Preventing economists' capture / Luigi Zingales -- Corrosive capture? : the dueling forces of autonomy and industry influence in FDA pharmaceutical regulation / Daniel Carpenter -- Misdiagnosing capture and case studies of regulatory success -- Capturing history : the case of the federal radio commission in 1927 / David Moss and Jonathan Lackow -- Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture : evidence from coal mine safety regulation / Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer -- Captured by disaster? : reinterpreting regulatory behavior in the shadow of the Gulf oil spill / Christopher Carrigan -- Reconsidering agency capture during regulatory policymaking / Susan Webb Yackee -- Coalitions, autonomy, and regulatory bargains in public health law / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- The possibility of preventing capture -- Preventing capture through consumer empowerment programs : some evidence from insurance regulation / Daniel Schwarcz -- Courts and regulatory capture / M. Elizabeth Magill -- Can executive review help prevent capture? / Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore -- Conclusion / David Moss and Daniel Carpenter -- Afterword / Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and Jim Leach, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities
Control code
FIEb1737876x
Dimensions
24 cm.
Extent
xxviii, 501 pages
Isbn
9781107646704
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
System control number
  • FIE
  • (OCoLC)871274244
Label
Preventing regulatory capture : special interest influence and how to limit it, [edited by] Daniel Carpenter, Harvard University, David A. Moss, Harvard University
Publication
Note
Includes index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
Acknowledgements -- Contributors -- Preface -- Introduction / Daniel Carpenter and David Moss -- Failures of capture scholarship -- A revisionist history of regulatory capture / William Novak -- The concept of regulatory capture : a short, inglorious history / Richard Posner -- Detecting and measuring capture / Daniel Carpenter -- New conceptions of capture : mechanisms and outcomes -- Cultural capture and the financial crisis / James Kwak -- Complexity, capacity, and capture / Nolan McCarty -- Preventing economists' capture / Luigi Zingales -- Corrosive capture? : the dueling forces of autonomy and industry influence in FDA pharmaceutical regulation / Daniel Carpenter -- Misdiagnosing capture and case studies of regulatory success -- Capturing history : the case of the federal radio commission in 1927 / David Moss and Jonathan Lackow -- Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture : evidence from coal mine safety regulation / Sanford Gordon and Catherine Hafer -- Captured by disaster? : reinterpreting regulatory behavior in the shadow of the Gulf oil spill / Christopher Carrigan -- Reconsidering agency capture during regulatory policymaking / Susan Webb Yackee -- Coalitions, autonomy, and regulatory bargains in public health law / Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar -- The possibility of preventing capture -- Preventing capture through consumer empowerment programs : some evidence from insurance regulation / Daniel Schwarcz -- Courts and regulatory capture / M. Elizabeth Magill -- Can executive review help prevent capture? / Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore -- Conclusion / David Moss and Daniel Carpenter -- Afterword / Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and Jim Leach, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities
Control code
FIEb1737876x
Dimensions
24 cm.
Extent
xxviii, 501 pages
Isbn
9781107646704
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
System control number
  • FIE
  • (OCoLC)871274244

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