The Resource Power sharing in legislatures : mega seats in twenty European parliamentary democracies, Jorge Miguel Fernandes

Power sharing in legislatures : mega seats in twenty European parliamentary democracies, Jorge Miguel Fernandes

Label
Power sharing in legislatures : mega seats in twenty European parliamentary democracies
Title
Power sharing in legislatures
Title remainder
mega seats in twenty European parliamentary democracies
Statement of responsibility
Jorge Miguel Fernandes
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Recent contributions in legislative studies field have coined the term mega-seats to denote committee systems and leadership bodies. The significance of viewing the internal bodies of legislatures as mega-seats is that they are conceived as part of the democratic delegation chain. Consequently, such an approach adds a political bargaining dimension to the allocation of mega-seats. During the internal organization process of the legislature, plenary legislators become principals, who delegate power to internal bodies, mainly to enhance labor division, tackle information asymmetries, and channel party demands. This thesis examines the process of payoff distribution in legislatures, using an original dataset containing 350 parties, in 12 Western European parliamentary democracies. The analysis is carried out at the party level as well as at the legislature level. Moreover, I conduct two case studies - Portugal and the United Kingdom - to further disentangle the causal mechanisms used to explain mega-seats allocation in parliamentary democracies. The empirical analysis starts with an examination of whether the division of payoffs (i.e., mega-seats) follows a proportionality logic. The proportionality assumption is borrowed from coalition studies, which have long established that institutional payoffs are distributed in a 1:1 proportionality. Using a new index to gauge disproportionality in the allocation of legislative mega-seats, the first finding of this thesis is that mega-seats allocation in parliamentary democracies is not proportional. Subsequently, I adduce a model that explains this counterintuitive finding at the party and legislature levels. The second main finding is that a party's degree of disproportionality is a function of its power. Parties are conceived as having a number of resources to spend on mega-seats distribution. The way they spend these resources is constrained by the existence of proportionality protection rules within an institution and incentivized by the value of the payoff. Regarding the former, I find that rules matter in protecting proportionality whilst for the latter I find that the amount of resources parties are willing to spend on a mega-seat depends on the mega-seat's power. Finally, the third main finding is that, at the aggregate level, the overall power of the legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive branch is important in determining the degree of disproportionality. Powerful legislatures tend to be more disproportional, as executive members seek control of its internal bodies
Member of
Cataloging source
IT-FiEUI
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Fernandes, Jorge Miguel
Date time place
Defence date: 17 September 2013
Dissertation note
Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (SPS), 2013.
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
theses
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
European University Institute
Series statement
  • EUI PhD theses
  • EUI theses
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Legislative bodies
  • Political parties
  • Committees
  • European Union countries
Label
Power sharing in legislatures : mega seats in twenty European parliamentary democracies, Jorge Miguel Fernandes
Instantiates
Publication
Note
Examining Board: Professor Stefano Bartolini, EUI (Supervisor); Professor Mark N. Franklin, MIT/EUI; Professor Kaare Strøm, University of California, San Diego (External Supervisor); Professor Shane Martin, University of Leicester
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 191-210)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Control code
FIEb1737151x
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
xiii, 211 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
  • n
System control number
(OCoLC)1088482526
Label
Power sharing in legislatures : mega seats in twenty European parliamentary democracies, Jorge Miguel Fernandes
Publication
Note
Examining Board: Professor Stefano Bartolini, EUI (Supervisor); Professor Mark N. Franklin, MIT/EUI; Professor Kaare Strøm, University of California, San Diego (External Supervisor); Professor Shane Martin, University of Leicester
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 191-210)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Control code
FIEb1737151x
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
xiii, 211 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
  • n
System control number
(OCoLC)1088482526

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