The Resource Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, (electronic resource)
Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, (electronic resource)
Resource Information
The item Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, (electronic resource) represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute.This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
Resource Information
The item Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, (electronic resource) represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute.
This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
- Language
- eng
- Extent
- 50 pages
- Note
- "Industrial organization"
- Label
- Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
- Title
- Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave
- Statement of responsibility
- Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider
- Language
- eng
- Cataloging source
- StEdALDL
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
- Englmaier, Florian
- Index
- no index present
- Literary form
- non fiction
- Nature of contents
- dictionaries
- http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
- 1972-
- http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
-
- Muehlheusser, Gerd
- Roider, Andreas
- Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)
- Series statement
- Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research
- Series volume
- no. 7914
- http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
-
- Contracts
- Agency (Law)
- Limited liability
- Moral hazard
- Label
- Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, (electronic resource)
- Note
- "Industrial organization"
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references
- Carrier category
- online resource
- Carrier category code
-
- cr
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier.
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent.
- Control code
- FIEb16930769
- Dimensions
- 21 cm.
- Extent
- 50 pages
- Media category
- computer
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia.
- Media type code
-
- c
- Specific material designation
- remote
- System control number
-
- UkOxUb17267278
- (OCoLC)752007874
- Label
- Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, (electronic resource)
- Note
- "Industrial organization"
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references
- Carrier category
- online resource
- Carrier category code
-
- cr
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier.
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent.
- Control code
- FIEb16930769
- Dimensions
- 21 cm.
- Extent
- 50 pages
- Media category
- computer
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia.
- Media type code
-
- c
- Specific material designation
- remote
- System control number
-
- UkOxUb17267278
- (OCoLC)752007874
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.library.eui.eu/portal/Optimal-incentive-contracts-under-moral-hazard/z5WPmJa1vxs/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.library.eui.eu/portal/Optimal-incentive-contracts-under-moral-hazard/z5WPmJa1vxs/">Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, (electronic resource)</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.library.eui.eu/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.library.eui.eu/">European University Institute</a></span></span></span></span></div>
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.library.eui.eu/portal/Optimal-incentive-contracts-under-moral-hazard/z5WPmJa1vxs/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.library.eui.eu/portal/Optimal-incentive-contracts-under-moral-hazard/z5WPmJa1vxs/">Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, (electronic resource)</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.library.eui.eu/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.library.eui.eu/">European University Institute</a></span></span></span></span></div>
