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The Resource Nixon's nuclear specter : the secret alert of 1969, madman diplomacy, and the Vietnam War, William Burr, Jeffrey P. Kimball

Nixon's nuclear specter : the secret alert of 1969, madman diplomacy, and the Vietnam War, William Burr, Jeffrey P. Kimball

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Author
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Summary
In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for otacticalo nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by HanoiAEs defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a ospecial remindero of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administrationAEs strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a olong-routeo policy of providing Saigon with a odecent chanceo of survival for a odecent intervalo after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to offer a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.--
Language
eng
Work
Publication
Extent
xv, 455 pages
Contents
  • Prelude: nuclear diplomacy and notions about nuclear use from Truman to Johnson, August 1945-January 1969
  • The madman theory: Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, and Dr. Strangelove, 1945-1969
  • The "big game" and the bombing of Cambodia, December 1968-March 1969
  • The Vance ploy and the Mining ruse, March-April 1969
  • The Mining ruse, threat diplomacy, peace plans, and withdrawals, April-July 1969
  • The first Duck Hook Plan, the "Nixon Doctrine, " and a deadline, July-August 1969
  • Toward the November option: Duck Hook and Pruning Knife, July-September 1969
  • To escalate or not to escalate? September-October 1969
  • The secret nuclear alert, October 1969
  • Epilogue: aftermaths and assessments
Isbn
9780700620821
Instance
Label
Nixon's nuclear specter : the secret alert of 1969, madman diplomacy, and the Vietnam War
Title
Nixon's nuclear specter
Title remainder
the secret alert of 1969, madman diplomacy, and the Vietnam War
Statement of responsibility
William Burr, Jeffrey P. Kimball
Creator
Contributor
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for otacticalo nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by HanoiAEs defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a ospecial remindero of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administrationAEs strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a olong-routeo policy of providing Saigon with a odecent chanceo of survival for a odecent intervalo after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to offer a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.--
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Provided by publisher
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DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Burr, William
Illustrations
  • illustrations
  • maps
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Kimball, Jeffrey P
Series statement
Modern war studies
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Nixon, Richard M.
  • Vietnam War, 1961-1975
  • Nuclear weapons
  • United States
  • United States
Label
Nixon's nuclear specter : the secret alert of 1969, madman diplomacy, and the Vietnam War, William Burr, Jeffrey P. Kimball
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 417-433) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
Prelude: nuclear diplomacy and notions about nuclear use from Truman to Johnson, August 1945-January 1969 -- The madman theory: Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, and Dr. Strangelove, 1945-1969 -- The "big game" and the bombing of Cambodia, December 1968-March 1969 -- The Vance ploy and the Mining ruse, March-April 1969 -- The Mining ruse, threat diplomacy, peace plans, and withdrawals, April-July 1969 -- The first Duck Hook Plan, the "Nixon Doctrine, " and a deadline, July-August 1969 -- Toward the November option: Duck Hook and Pruning Knife, July-September 1969 -- To escalate or not to escalate? September-October 1969 -- The secret nuclear alert, October 1969 -- Epilogue: aftermaths and assessments
Control code
FIEb17716172
Dimensions
24 cm.
Extent
xv, 455 pages
Isbn
9780700620821
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
n
Other physical details
illustrations, maps
System control number
(OCoLC)895730697
Label
Nixon's nuclear specter : the secret alert of 1969, madman diplomacy, and the Vietnam War, William Burr, Jeffrey P. Kimball
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 417-433) and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
Prelude: nuclear diplomacy and notions about nuclear use from Truman to Johnson, August 1945-January 1969 -- The madman theory: Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, and Dr. Strangelove, 1945-1969 -- The "big game" and the bombing of Cambodia, December 1968-March 1969 -- The Vance ploy and the Mining ruse, March-April 1969 -- The Mining ruse, threat diplomacy, peace plans, and withdrawals, April-July 1969 -- The first Duck Hook Plan, the "Nixon Doctrine, " and a deadline, July-August 1969 -- Toward the November option: Duck Hook and Pruning Knife, July-September 1969 -- To escalate or not to escalate? September-October 1969 -- The secret nuclear alert, October 1969 -- Epilogue: aftermaths and assessments
Control code
FIEb17716172
Dimensions
24 cm.
Extent
xv, 455 pages
Isbn
9780700620821
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
n
Other physical details
illustrations, maps
System control number
(OCoLC)895730697

Subject

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