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The Resource Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources : the case of radio spectrum and energy resources, Gonçalo Miguel Banha Coelho

Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources : the case of radio spectrum and energy resources, Gonçalo Miguel Banha Coelho

Creator
Contributor
Summary
The Thesis analyses the impact of the regulation of radio spectrum and energy resources in the liberalisation of wireless communications and electricity in the European Union (EU). The answer to this inquiry presupposes a discussion of three sub-questions: (i) what is the competence of the EU to regulate energy resources ("the power gap")?; (ii) is there a gap in the regulation of natural resources ("the regulatory gap")?; and (iii) how has the Commission used other instruments, particularly competition law, to bridge the two gaps. The Introduction presents the institutional economics approach that guides the reader throughout the Thesis. It builds upon Williamson's four levels of institutional analysis and argues that the way in which access to natural resources is structured (level 2 of institutional analysis), deeply impacts the regulatory design of the network industries and the way in which the Commission shapes the application of competition law. Its purpose is not to present an ideal system of resource management but rather to highlight that all institutional decisions bear costs, and that, in the absence of level 2 interventions, the Commission has used imperfect alternative solutions, such as competition law, to bridge the regulatory and power gaps. Having laid out an analytical methodology, I move to the specific discussion of radio spectrum (Chapters 1-4) and energy resources (Chapters 5-6). In the two parts of the Thesis I use the U.S. as a benchmark for analysis so as to demonstrate that several institutional solutions are possible: command and control backed-up by public ownership, market mechanisms with private property and commons (the latter is discussed only in relation with wireless communications). Starting with the "power gap", I argue that it does not stem from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Articles 345 and 194(2) TFEU) and that, despite its practical consequences, it has an essentially epistemological nature (Chapters 2 and 5). Chapters 3 and 5 offer a 5 thorough analysis of the EU's attempts to directly regulate radio spectrum and energy resources irrespective of the power gap. The argument put forward is that "level 2" interventions by the EU have been scant and generally ineffective, having therefore contributed to the creation or reinforcement of bottlenecks in wireless communications and electricity. As a result, the Commission has resorted to imperfect alternative institutional solutions, especially competition law in a 'property rights' way that compensates for a perceived lack of powers to regulate natural resources directly. Albeit unorthodox, this approach to the redesign of property rights held by Member States was ratified by the Court of Justice in its Greek Lignites judgment and the subsequent line of argumentation followed up by the Commission in follow-up cases
Language
eng
Work
Publication
Extent
v, 318 pages
Note
Examining Board: Professor Giorgio Monti (Supervisor), European University Institute; Professor Eric Brousseau, Paris-Dauphine University; Professor Angus Johnston, University College Oxford; Professor Pierre Larouche, Tilburg University
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/41265
Instance
Label
Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources : the case of radio spectrum and energy resources
Title
Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources
Title remainder
the case of radio spectrum and energy resources
Statement of responsibility
Gonçalo Miguel Banha Coelho
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
The Thesis analyses the impact of the regulation of radio spectrum and energy resources in the liberalisation of wireless communications and electricity in the European Union (EU). The answer to this inquiry presupposes a discussion of three sub-questions: (i) what is the competence of the EU to regulate energy resources ("the power gap")?; (ii) is there a gap in the regulation of natural resources ("the regulatory gap")?; and (iii) how has the Commission used other instruments, particularly competition law, to bridge the two gaps. The Introduction presents the institutional economics approach that guides the reader throughout the Thesis. It builds upon Williamson's four levels of institutional analysis and argues that the way in which access to natural resources is structured (level 2 of institutional analysis), deeply impacts the regulatory design of the network industries and the way in which the Commission shapes the application of competition law. Its purpose is not to present an ideal system of resource management but rather to highlight that all institutional decisions bear costs, and that, in the absence of level 2 interventions, the Commission has used imperfect alternative solutions, such as competition law, to bridge the regulatory and power gaps. Having laid out an analytical methodology, I move to the specific discussion of radio spectrum (Chapters 1-4) and energy resources (Chapters 5-6). In the two parts of the Thesis I use the U.S. as a benchmark for analysis so as to demonstrate that several institutional solutions are possible: command and control backed-up by public ownership, market mechanisms with private property and commons (the latter is discussed only in relation with wireless communications). Starting with the "power gap", I argue that it does not stem from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Articles 345 and 194(2) TFEU) and that, despite its practical consequences, it has an essentially epistemological nature (Chapters 2 and 5). Chapters 3 and 5 offer a 5 thorough analysis of the EU's attempts to directly regulate radio spectrum and energy resources irrespective of the power gap. The argument put forward is that "level 2" interventions by the EU have been scant and generally ineffective, having therefore contributed to the creation or reinforcement of bottlenecks in wireless communications and electricity. As a result, the Commission has resorted to imperfect alternative institutional solutions, especially competition law in a 'property rights' way that compensates for a perceived lack of powers to regulate natural resources directly. Albeit unorthodox, this approach to the redesign of property rights held by Member States was ratified by the Court of Justice in its Greek Lignites judgment and the subsequent line of argumentation followed up by the Commission in follow-up cases
Cataloging source
FIE
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Coelho, Gonçalo Miguel Banha
Date time place
Defence date: 9 May 2016
Dissertation note
Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (LAW), 2016.
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
theses
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
European University Institute
Series statement
  • EUI PhD theses.
  • EUI theses
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Telecommunication
  • Radio
  • Electric utilities
  • Antitrust law
Label
Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources : the case of radio spectrum and energy resources, Gonçalo Miguel Banha Coelho
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/41265
Instantiates
Publication
Note
Examining Board: Professor Giorgio Monti (Supervisor), European University Institute; Professor Eric Brousseau, Paris-Dauphine University; Professor Angus Johnston, University College Oxford; Professor Pierre Larouche, Tilburg University
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-318)
Control code
FIEb17839956
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
v, 318 pages
System control number
(OCoLC)1088462134
Label
Liberalisation of network industries and access to natural resources : the case of radio spectrum and energy resources, Gonçalo Miguel Banha Coelho
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/41265
Publication
Note
Examining Board: Professor Giorgio Monti (Supervisor), European University Institute; Professor Eric Brousseau, Paris-Dauphine University; Professor Angus Johnston, University College Oxford; Professor Pierre Larouche, Tilburg University
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-318)
Control code
FIEb17839956
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
v, 318 pages
System control number
(OCoLC)1088462134

Subject

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