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The Resource Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource)

Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource)

Creator
Author
Contributor
Summary
The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.--
Language
eng
Work
Publication
Edition
Second edition.
Extent
1 online resource (xv, 309 pages)
Contents
  • 13
  • 112
  • 3
  • Party Leadership
  • 115
  • 4
  • Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder
  • 123
  • Part 3
  • Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions
  • 127
  • Part 1
  • 6
  • On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
  • 129
  • 1
  • Party Voting: Trends Since 1980
  • 130
  • 2
  • Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s
  • 131
  • 3
  • The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees
  • Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
  • 135
  • Part 4
  • Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments
  • 149
  • 7
  • Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
  • 153
  • 1
  • Assignments to Control Committees
  • 15
  • 154
  • 2
  • Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees
  • 155
  • 3
  • Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995
  • 170
  • 4
  • Assignment Success of Freshmen
  • 171
  • 1
  • 8
  • Contingents and Parties
  • 176
  • 1
  • A Model of Partisan Selection
  • 177
  • 2
  • Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative?
  • 178
  • 3
  • Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
  • Results
  • 188
  • Part 5
  • Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power
  • 211
  • 9
  • The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda
  • 213
  • 1
  • The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
  • 17
  • 215
  • 2
  • Limits on the Scheduling Power
  • 217
  • 3
  • Committee Agendas and the Speaker
  • 221
  • 4
  • Intercommittee Logrolls
  • 227
  • 1
  • 5
  • Coalitional Stability
  • 230
  • 6
  • Critiques and Rejoinders
  • 232
  • 10
  • Controlling the Legislative Agenda
  • 235
  • 1
  • Self Selection
  • The Majority Party and the Committee System
  • 236
  • 2
  • The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda
  • 241
  • 3
  • The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy
  • 250
  • 4
  • Comments on the Postwar House
  • 19
  • 251
  • Appendix 1
  • Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
  • 259
  • Appendix 2
  • A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences
  • 263
  • Appendix 3
  • Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
  • 267
  • 1
  • 2
  • Appendix 4
  • The Scheduling Power
  • 269
  • Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests
  • 21
  • 3
  • Accommodation of Assignment Requests
  • 25
  • 4
  • Accommodation of Transfer Requests
  • 32
  • 5
  • The Weakness of Parties
  • The Routinization of the Assignment Process
  • 37
  • 6
  • What of Norms in the Assignment Process?
  • 39
  • 7
  • Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution
  • 40
  • 2
  • The Seniority System in Congress
  • 2
  • 43
  • 1
  • Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View
  • 44
  • 2
  • Reconsidering the Standard View
  • 45
  • 3
  • The Empirical Evidence
  • 47
  • 2
  • 4
  • Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule
  • 52
  • 5
  • Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution
  • 55
  • 3
  • Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees
  • 58
  • 1
  • Committee Government
  • The Previous Literature
  • 59
  • 2
  • Data and Methodology
  • 65
  • 3
  • Results
  • 68
  • 4
  • The Representativeness Thesis
  • 9
  • 72
  • Part 2
  • A Theory of Organization
  • 77
  • 4
  • Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas
  • 79
  • 1
  • Collective Dilemmas
  • 80
  • 3
  • 2
  • Central Authority: The Basics
  • 84
  • 3
  • Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary
  • 87
  • 4
  • Multiperiod Considerations
  • 92
  • 5
  • An Outline of the Book
  • Problems with Central Authority
  • 94
  • 5
  • A Theory of Legislative Parties
  • 99
  • 1
  • The Reelection Goal
  • 100
  • 2
  • Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies
Isbn
9780511810060
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511810060
Instance
Label
Legislative leviathan : party government in the House
Title
Legislative leviathan
Title remainder
party government in the House
Statement of responsibility
Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins
Creator
Contributor
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.--
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
UkCbUP
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Cox, Gary W
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1956-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
McCubbins, Mathew D.
Series statement
Cambridge Social Sciences eBooks
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • United States
  • United States
  • United States
  • Political parties
Label
Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511810060
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 13
  • 112
  • 3
  • Party Leadership
  • 115
  • 4
  • Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder
  • 123
  • Part 3
  • Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions
  • 127
  • Part 1
  • 6
  • On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
  • 129
  • 1
  • Party Voting: Trends Since 1980
  • 130
  • 2
  • Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s
  • 131
  • 3
  • The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees
  • Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
  • 135
  • Part 4
  • Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments
  • 149
  • 7
  • Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
  • 153
  • 1
  • Assignments to Control Committees
  • 15
  • 154
  • 2
  • Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees
  • 155
  • 3
  • Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995
  • 170
  • 4
  • Assignment Success of Freshmen
  • 171
  • 1
  • 8
  • Contingents and Parties
  • 176
  • 1
  • A Model of Partisan Selection
  • 177
  • 2
  • Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative?
  • 178
  • 3
  • Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
  • Results
  • 188
  • Part 5
  • Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power
  • 211
  • 9
  • The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda
  • 213
  • 1
  • The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
  • 17
  • 215
  • 2
  • Limits on the Scheduling Power
  • 217
  • 3
  • Committee Agendas and the Speaker
  • 221
  • 4
  • Intercommittee Logrolls
  • 227
  • 1
  • 5
  • Coalitional Stability
  • 230
  • 6
  • Critiques and Rejoinders
  • 232
  • 10
  • Controlling the Legislative Agenda
  • 235
  • 1
  • Self Selection
  • The Majority Party and the Committee System
  • 236
  • 2
  • The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda
  • 241
  • 3
  • The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy
  • 250
  • 4
  • Comments on the Postwar House
  • 19
  • 251
  • Appendix 1
  • Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
  • 259
  • Appendix 2
  • A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences
  • 263
  • Appendix 3
  • Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
  • 267
  • 1
  • 2
  • Appendix 4
  • The Scheduling Power
  • 269
  • Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests
  • 21
  • 3
  • Accommodation of Assignment Requests
  • 25
  • 4
  • Accommodation of Transfer Requests
  • 32
  • 5
  • The Weakness of Parties
  • The Routinization of the Assignment Process
  • 37
  • 6
  • What of Norms in the Assignment Process?
  • 39
  • 7
  • Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution
  • 40
  • 2
  • The Seniority System in Congress
  • 2
  • 43
  • 1
  • Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View
  • 44
  • 2
  • Reconsidering the Standard View
  • 45
  • 3
  • The Empirical Evidence
  • 47
  • 2
  • 4
  • Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule
  • 52
  • 5
  • Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution
  • 55
  • 3
  • Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees
  • 58
  • 1
  • Committee Government
  • The Previous Literature
  • 59
  • 2
  • Data and Methodology
  • 65
  • 3
  • Results
  • 68
  • 4
  • The Representativeness Thesis
  • 9
  • 72
  • Part 2
  • A Theory of Organization
  • 77
  • 4
  • Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas
  • 79
  • 1
  • Collective Dilemmas
  • 80
  • 3
  • 2
  • Central Authority: The Basics
  • 84
  • 3
  • Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary
  • 87
  • 4
  • Multiperiod Considerations
  • 92
  • 5
  • An Outline of the Book
  • Problems with Central Authority
  • 94
  • 5
  • A Theory of Legislative Parties
  • 99
  • 1
  • The Reelection Goal
  • 100
  • 2
  • Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies
Control code
CR9780511810060
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
Second edition.
Extent
1 online resource (xv, 309 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780511810060
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)166507015
Label
Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511810060
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 13
  • 112
  • 3
  • Party Leadership
  • 115
  • 4
  • Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder
  • 123
  • Part 3
  • Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions
  • 127
  • Part 1
  • 6
  • On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
  • 129
  • 1
  • Party Voting: Trends Since 1980
  • 130
  • 2
  • Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s
  • 131
  • 3
  • The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees
  • Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
  • 135
  • Part 4
  • Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments
  • 149
  • 7
  • Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
  • 153
  • 1
  • Assignments to Control Committees
  • 15
  • 154
  • 2
  • Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees
  • 155
  • 3
  • Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995
  • 170
  • 4
  • Assignment Success of Freshmen
  • 171
  • 1
  • 8
  • Contingents and Parties
  • 176
  • 1
  • A Model of Partisan Selection
  • 177
  • 2
  • Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative?
  • 178
  • 3
  • Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
  • Results
  • 188
  • Part 5
  • Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power
  • 211
  • 9
  • The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda
  • 213
  • 1
  • The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
  • 17
  • 215
  • 2
  • Limits on the Scheduling Power
  • 217
  • 3
  • Committee Agendas and the Speaker
  • 221
  • 4
  • Intercommittee Logrolls
  • 227
  • 1
  • 5
  • Coalitional Stability
  • 230
  • 6
  • Critiques and Rejoinders
  • 232
  • 10
  • Controlling the Legislative Agenda
  • 235
  • 1
  • Self Selection
  • The Majority Party and the Committee System
  • 236
  • 2
  • The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda
  • 241
  • 3
  • The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy
  • 250
  • 4
  • Comments on the Postwar House
  • 19
  • 251
  • Appendix 1
  • Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
  • 259
  • Appendix 2
  • A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences
  • 263
  • Appendix 3
  • Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
  • 267
  • 1
  • 2
  • Appendix 4
  • The Scheduling Power
  • 269
  • Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests
  • 21
  • 3
  • Accommodation of Assignment Requests
  • 25
  • 4
  • Accommodation of Transfer Requests
  • 32
  • 5
  • The Weakness of Parties
  • The Routinization of the Assignment Process
  • 37
  • 6
  • What of Norms in the Assignment Process?
  • 39
  • 7
  • Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution
  • 40
  • 2
  • The Seniority System in Congress
  • 2
  • 43
  • 1
  • Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View
  • 44
  • 2
  • Reconsidering the Standard View
  • 45
  • 3
  • The Empirical Evidence
  • 47
  • 2
  • 4
  • Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule
  • 52
  • 5
  • Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution
  • 55
  • 3
  • Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees
  • 58
  • 1
  • Committee Government
  • The Previous Literature
  • 59
  • 2
  • Data and Methodology
  • 65
  • 3
  • Results
  • 68
  • 4
  • The Representativeness Thesis
  • 9
  • 72
  • Part 2
  • A Theory of Organization
  • 77
  • 4
  • Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas
  • 79
  • 1
  • Collective Dilemmas
  • 80
  • 3
  • 2
  • Central Authority: The Basics
  • 84
  • 3
  • Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary
  • 87
  • 4
  • Multiperiod Considerations
  • 92
  • 5
  • An Outline of the Book
  • Problems with Central Authority
  • 94
  • 5
  • A Theory of Legislative Parties
  • 99
  • 1
  • The Reelection Goal
  • 100
  • 2
  • Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies
Control code
CR9780511810060
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
Second edition.
Extent
1 online resource (xv, 309 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780511810060
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)166507015

Subject

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