The Resource Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource)
Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource)
Resource Information
The item Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource) represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute Library.This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
Resource Information
The item Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource) represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute Library.
This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
- Edition
- Second edition.
- Extent
- 1 online resource (xv, 309 pages)
- Contents
-
- 13
- 112
- 3
- Party Leadership
- 115
- 4
- Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder
- 123
- Part 3
- Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions
- 127
- Part 1
- 6
- On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
- 129
- 1
- Party Voting: Trends Since 1980
- 130
- 2
- Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s
- 131
- 3
- The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees
- Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
- 135
- Part 4
- Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments
- 149
- 7
- Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
- 153
- 1
- Assignments to Control Committees
- 15
- 154
- 2
- Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees
- 155
- 3
- Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995
- 170
- 4
- Assignment Success of Freshmen
- 171
- 1
- 8
- Contingents and Parties
- 176
- 1
- A Model of Partisan Selection
- 177
- 2
- Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative?
- 178
- 3
- Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
- Results
- 188
- Part 5
- Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power
- 211
- 9
- The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda
- 213
- 1
- The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
- 17
- 215
- 2
- Limits on the Scheduling Power
- 217
- 3
- Committee Agendas and the Speaker
- 221
- 4
- Intercommittee Logrolls
- 227
- 1
- 5
- Coalitional Stability
- 230
- 6
- Critiques and Rejoinders
- 232
- 10
- Controlling the Legislative Agenda
- 235
- 1
- Self Selection
- The Majority Party and the Committee System
- 236
- 2
- The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda
- 241
- 3
- The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy
- 250
- 4
- Comments on the Postwar House
- 19
- 251
- Appendix 1
- Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
- 259
- Appendix 2
- A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences
- 263
- Appendix 3
- Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
- 267
- 1
- 2
- Appendix 4
- The Scheduling Power
- 269
- Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests
- 21
- 3
- Accommodation of Assignment Requests
- 25
- 4
- Accommodation of Transfer Requests
- 32
- 5
- The Weakness of Parties
- The Routinization of the Assignment Process
- 37
- 6
- What of Norms in the Assignment Process?
- 39
- 7
- Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution
- 40
- 2
- The Seniority System in Congress
- 2
- 43
- 1
- Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View
- 44
- 2
- Reconsidering the Standard View
- 45
- 3
- The Empirical Evidence
- 47
- 2
- 4
- Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule
- 52
- 5
- Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution
- 55
- 3
- Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees
- 58
- 1
- Committee Government
- The Previous Literature
- 59
- 2
- Data and Methodology
- 65
- 3
- Results
- 68
- 4
- The Representativeness Thesis
- 9
- 72
- Part 2
- A Theory of Organization
- 77
- 4
- Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas
- 79
- 1
- Collective Dilemmas
- 80
- 3
- 2
- Central Authority: The Basics
- 84
- 3
- Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary
- 87
- 4
- Multiperiod Considerations
- 92
- 5
- An Outline of the Book
- Problems with Central Authority
- 94
- 5
- A Theory of Legislative Parties
- 99
- 1
- The Reelection Goal
- 100
- 2
- Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies
- Isbn
- 9780511810060
- Label
- Legislative leviathan : party government in the House
- Title
- Legislative leviathan
- Title remainder
- party government in the House
- Statement of responsibility
- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins
- Language
- eng
- Cataloging source
- IT-FiEUI
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
- Cox, Gary W
- Index
- index present
- Literary form
- non fiction
- Nature of contents
- bibliography
- http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
- 1956-
- http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
- McCubbins, Mathew D.
- http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
-
- United States
- United States
- United States
- Political parties
- Label
- Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource)
- Carrier category
- online resource
- Carrier category code
-
- cr
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
-
- 13
- 112
- 3
- Party Leadership
- 115
- 4
- Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder
- 123
- Part 3
- Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions
- 127
- Part 1
- 6
- On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
- 129
- 1
- Party Voting: Trends Since 1980
- 130
- 2
- Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s
- 131
- 3
- The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees
- Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
- 135
- Part 4
- Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments
- 149
- 7
- Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
- 153
- 1
- Assignments to Control Committees
- 15
- 154
- 2
- Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees
- 155
- 3
- Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995
- 170
- 4
- Assignment Success of Freshmen
- 171
- 1
- 8
- Contingents and Parties
- 176
- 1
- A Model of Partisan Selection
- 177
- 2
- Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative?
- 178
- 3
- Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
- Results
- 188
- Part 5
- Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power
- 211
- 9
- The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda
- 213
- 1
- The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
- 17
- 215
- 2
- Limits on the Scheduling Power
- 217
- 3
- Committee Agendas and the Speaker
- 221
- 4
- Intercommittee Logrolls
- 227
- 1
- 5
- Coalitional Stability
- 230
- 6
- Critiques and Rejoinders
- 232
- 10
- Controlling the Legislative Agenda
- 235
- 1
- Self Selection
- The Majority Party and the Committee System
- 236
- 2
- The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda
- 241
- 3
- The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy
- 250
- 4
- Comments on the Postwar House
- 19
- 251
- Appendix 1
- Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
- 259
- Appendix 2
- A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences
- 263
- Appendix 3
- Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
- 267
- 1
- 2
- Appendix 4
- The Scheduling Power
- 269
- Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests
- 21
- 3
- Accommodation of Assignment Requests
- 25
- 4
- Accommodation of Transfer Requests
- 32
- 5
- The Weakness of Parties
- The Routinization of the Assignment Process
- 37
- 6
- What of Norms in the Assignment Process?
- 39
- 7
- Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution
- 40
- 2
- The Seniority System in Congress
- 2
- 43
- 1
- Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View
- 44
- 2
- Reconsidering the Standard View
- 45
- 3
- The Empirical Evidence
- 47
- 2
- 4
- Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule
- 52
- 5
- Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution
- 55
- 3
- Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees
- 58
- 1
- Committee Government
- The Previous Literature
- 59
- 2
- Data and Methodology
- 65
- 3
- Results
- 68
- 4
- The Representativeness Thesis
- 9
- 72
- Part 2
- A Theory of Organization
- 77
- 4
- Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas
- 79
- 1
- Collective Dilemmas
- 80
- 3
- 2
- Central Authority: The Basics
- 84
- 3
- Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary
- 87
- 4
- Multiperiod Considerations
- 92
- 5
- An Outline of the Book
- Problems with Central Authority
- 94
- 5
- A Theory of Legislative Parties
- 99
- 1
- The Reelection Goal
- 100
- 2
- Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies
- Control code
- CR9780511810060
- Dimensions
- unknown
- Edition
- Second edition.
- Extent
- 1 online resource (xv, 309 pages)
- Form of item
- online
- Governing access note
- Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
- Isbn
- 9780511810060
- Media category
- computer
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- c
- Other physical details
- digital, PDF file(s).
- Specific material designation
- remote
- System control number
- (OCoLC)166507015
- Label
- Legislative leviathan : party government in the House, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, (electronic resource)
- Carrier category
- online resource
- Carrier category code
-
- cr
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent
- Contents
-
- 13
- 112
- 3
- Party Leadership
- 115
- 4
- Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder
- 123
- Part 3
- Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions
- 127
- Part 1
- 6
- On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
- 129
- 1
- Party Voting: Trends Since 1980
- 130
- 2
- Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s
- 131
- 3
- The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees
- Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes
- 135
- Part 4
- Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments
- 149
- 7
- Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments
- 153
- 1
- Assignments to Control Committees
- 15
- 154
- 2
- Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees
- 155
- 3
- Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995
- 170
- 4
- Assignment Success of Freshmen
- 171
- 1
- 8
- Contingents and Parties
- 176
- 1
- A Model of Partisan Selection
- 177
- 2
- Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative?
- 178
- 3
- Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis
- Results
- 188
- Part 5
- Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power
- 211
- 9
- The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda
- 213
- 1
- The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem
- 17
- 215
- 2
- Limits on the Scheduling Power
- 217
- 3
- Committee Agendas and the Speaker
- 221
- 4
- Intercommittee Logrolls
- 227
- 1
- 5
- Coalitional Stability
- 230
- 6
- Critiques and Rejoinders
- 232
- 10
- Controlling the Legislative Agenda
- 235
- 1
- Self Selection
- The Majority Party and the Committee System
- 236
- 2
- The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda
- 241
- 3
- The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy
- 250
- 4
- Comments on the Postwar House
- 19
- 251
- Appendix 1
- Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
- 259
- Appendix 2
- A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences
- 263
- Appendix 3
- Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
- 267
- 1
- 2
- Appendix 4
- The Scheduling Power
- 269
- Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests
- 21
- 3
- Accommodation of Assignment Requests
- 25
- 4
- Accommodation of Transfer Requests
- 32
- 5
- The Weakness of Parties
- The Routinization of the Assignment Process
- 37
- 6
- What of Norms in the Assignment Process?
- 39
- 7
- Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution
- 40
- 2
- The Seniority System in Congress
- 2
- 43
- 1
- Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View
- 44
- 2
- Reconsidering the Standard View
- 45
- 3
- The Empirical Evidence
- 47
- 2
- 4
- Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule
- 52
- 5
- Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution
- 55
- 3
- Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees
- 58
- 1
- Committee Government
- The Previous Literature
- 59
- 2
- Data and Methodology
- 65
- 3
- Results
- 68
- 4
- The Representativeness Thesis
- 9
- 72
- Part 2
- A Theory of Organization
- 77
- 4
- Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas
- 79
- 1
- Collective Dilemmas
- 80
- 3
- 2
- Central Authority: The Basics
- 84
- 3
- Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary
- 87
- 4
- Multiperiod Considerations
- 92
- 5
- An Outline of the Book
- Problems with Central Authority
- 94
- 5
- A Theory of Legislative Parties
- 99
- 1
- The Reelection Goal
- 100
- 2
- Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies
- Control code
- CR9780511810060
- Dimensions
- unknown
- Edition
- Second edition.
- Extent
- 1 online resource (xv, 309 pages)
- Form of item
- online
- Governing access note
- Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
- Isbn
- 9780511810060
- Media category
- computer
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia
- Media type code
-
- c
- Other physical details
- digital, PDF file(s).
- Specific material designation
- remote
- System control number
- (OCoLC)166507015
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