Coverart for item
The Resource Handbook of game theory with economic applications, (electronic resource)

Handbook of game theory with economic applications, (electronic resource)

Label
Handbook of game theory with economic applications
Title
Handbook of game theory with economic applications
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This is the third volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners. The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by Publisher
Cataloging source
EYM
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
  • handbooks
Series statement
  • ScienceDirect Elsevier Economics Handbooks
  • Handbooks in economics
Series volume
11]
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Game theory
  • Economics, Mathematical
Target audience
specialized
Label
Handbook of game theory with economic applications, (electronic resource)
Link
https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.eui.eu/handbook/handbook-of-game-theory-with-economic-applications/volumes
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
file reproduced from original
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Color
mixed
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
  • Sylvain Sorin
  • Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum
  • Shmuel Zamir
  • Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum
  • Françoise Forges
  • Noncooperative models of bargaining
  • Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
  • Strategic analysis of auctions
  • Robert Wilson
  • Location
  • Vol. 1.
  • Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse
  • Strategic models of entry deterrence
  • Robert Wilson
  • Patent licensing
  • Morton I. Kamien
  • Core and balancedness
  • Yakar Kannai
  • Axiomatizations of the core
  • Bezalel Peleg
  • Core in perfectly competitive economics
  • Game of chess
  • Robert M. Anderson
  • Core in imperfectly competitive economies
  • Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz
  • Two-sided matching
  • Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor
  • Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
  • William F. Lucas
  • Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus
  • Michael Maschler
  • Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
  • Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer
  • John C. Harsanyi
  • Games in extenive and strategic forms
  • Sergiu Hart
  • Games with perfect information
  • Jan Mycielski
  • Repeated games with complete information
  • Simone Clemhout and Henry Y. Wan, Jr.
  • Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility
  • Roger B. Myerson
  • Signalling
  • David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel
  • Moral hazard
  • Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner
  • Search
  • John McMillan and Michael Rothschild
  • Game theory and Evolutionary biology
  • Vol. 2 .
  • Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten
  • Game theory models of peace and war
  • Barry O'Neill
  • Voting procedures
  • Steven J. Brams
  • Social choice
  • Hervé Moulin
  • Power and stability in politics
  • Philip D. Straffin Jr.
  • Game theory and public economics
  • Zero-sum two-person games
  • Mordecai Kurz
  • Cost allocation
  • H.P. Young
  • Cooperative models of bargaining
  • William Thomson
  • Games in coalitional form
  • Robert J. Weber
  • Coalition structure
  • Joseph Greenberg
  • Game-theoretic aspects of computing
  • T.E.S. Raghavan
  • Nathan Linial
  • Utility and subjective probability
  • Peter C. Fishburn
  • Common knowledge
  • John Geanakoplos
  • Game theory and statistics
  • Gideon Schwarz
  • Differential games
  • Avner Friedman
  • Differential games -- economic applications
  • T.E.S. Raghavan
  • Computing equilibria for two-person games
  • Bernhard Von Stengel
  • Non-cooperative games with many players
  • M. Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun
  • Stochastic games
  • Jean-François Mertens
  • Stochastic games: recent results
  • Nicolas Vielle
  • Game theory and industrial organization
  • Vol. 3 .
  • Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky
  • Bargaining with incomplete information
  • Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere
  • Inspection games
  • Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard Von Stengel and Shmeuel Zamir
  • Economic history and game theory
  • Avner Greif
  • Shapley Value
  • Eyal Winter
  • Variations on the Shapley value
  • Strategic equilibrium
  • Dov Monderer and Dov Samet
  • Values of non-transferable utility games
  • Richard P. McLean
  • Values of games with infinitely many players
  • Abraham Neyman
  • Values of perfectly competitive economies
  • Sergiu Hart
  • Some other economic applications of the value
  • Jean-François Mertens
  • Strategic aspects of political systems
  • Eric Van Damme
  • Jeffrey S. Banks
  • Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions
  • Jean-Pierre Benoît and Lewis A. Kornhauser
  • Implementation theory
  • Thomas R. Palfrey
  • Game theory and experimental gaming
  • Martin Shubik
  • Foundations of strategic equilibrium
  • John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg
  • Incomplete information
  • Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz
  • Non-zero-sum two-person games
  • V.4. Rationality ; Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games ; Games on Networks ; Reputations in Repeated Games ; Coalition Formation ; Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics ; Advances in Auctions ; Combinatorial Auctions ; Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multiunit auctions ; Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling ; Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology ; Epistemic Game Theory ; Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics ; The Complexity of Computing Equilibria ; Theory of Combinatorial Games ; Game Theory and Distributed Control ; Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility ; Calibration and Expert Testing
Control code
u396632
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (4 volumes)
File format
multiple file formats
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780444894274
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations.
Quality assurance targets
unknown
Reformatting quality
access
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1058695329
Label
Handbook of game theory with economic applications, (electronic resource)
Link
https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.eui.eu/handbook/handbook-of-game-theory-with-economic-applications/volumes
Publication
Antecedent source
file reproduced from original
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Color
mixed
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
  • Sylvain Sorin
  • Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum
  • Shmuel Zamir
  • Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum
  • Françoise Forges
  • Noncooperative models of bargaining
  • Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
  • Strategic analysis of auctions
  • Robert Wilson
  • Location
  • Vol. 1.
  • Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse
  • Strategic models of entry deterrence
  • Robert Wilson
  • Patent licensing
  • Morton I. Kamien
  • Core and balancedness
  • Yakar Kannai
  • Axiomatizations of the core
  • Bezalel Peleg
  • Core in perfectly competitive economics
  • Game of chess
  • Robert M. Anderson
  • Core in imperfectly competitive economies
  • Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz
  • Two-sided matching
  • Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor
  • Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
  • William F. Lucas
  • Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus
  • Michael Maschler
  • Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
  • Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer
  • John C. Harsanyi
  • Games in extenive and strategic forms
  • Sergiu Hart
  • Games with perfect information
  • Jan Mycielski
  • Repeated games with complete information
  • Simone Clemhout and Henry Y. Wan, Jr.
  • Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility
  • Roger B. Myerson
  • Signalling
  • David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel
  • Moral hazard
  • Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner
  • Search
  • John McMillan and Michael Rothschild
  • Game theory and Evolutionary biology
  • Vol. 2 .
  • Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten
  • Game theory models of peace and war
  • Barry O'Neill
  • Voting procedures
  • Steven J. Brams
  • Social choice
  • Hervé Moulin
  • Power and stability in politics
  • Philip D. Straffin Jr.
  • Game theory and public economics
  • Zero-sum two-person games
  • Mordecai Kurz
  • Cost allocation
  • H.P. Young
  • Cooperative models of bargaining
  • William Thomson
  • Games in coalitional form
  • Robert J. Weber
  • Coalition structure
  • Joseph Greenberg
  • Game-theoretic aspects of computing
  • T.E.S. Raghavan
  • Nathan Linial
  • Utility and subjective probability
  • Peter C. Fishburn
  • Common knowledge
  • John Geanakoplos
  • Game theory and statistics
  • Gideon Schwarz
  • Differential games
  • Avner Friedman
  • Differential games -- economic applications
  • T.E.S. Raghavan
  • Computing equilibria for two-person games
  • Bernhard Von Stengel
  • Non-cooperative games with many players
  • M. Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun
  • Stochastic games
  • Jean-François Mertens
  • Stochastic games: recent results
  • Nicolas Vielle
  • Game theory and industrial organization
  • Vol. 3 .
  • Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky
  • Bargaining with incomplete information
  • Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere
  • Inspection games
  • Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard Von Stengel and Shmeuel Zamir
  • Economic history and game theory
  • Avner Greif
  • Shapley Value
  • Eyal Winter
  • Variations on the Shapley value
  • Strategic equilibrium
  • Dov Monderer and Dov Samet
  • Values of non-transferable utility games
  • Richard P. McLean
  • Values of games with infinitely many players
  • Abraham Neyman
  • Values of perfectly competitive economies
  • Sergiu Hart
  • Some other economic applications of the value
  • Jean-François Mertens
  • Strategic aspects of political systems
  • Eric Van Damme
  • Jeffrey S. Banks
  • Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions
  • Jean-Pierre Benoît and Lewis A. Kornhauser
  • Implementation theory
  • Thomas R. Palfrey
  • Game theory and experimental gaming
  • Martin Shubik
  • Foundations of strategic equilibrium
  • John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg
  • Incomplete information
  • Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz
  • Non-zero-sum two-person games
  • V.4. Rationality ; Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games ; Games on Networks ; Reputations in Repeated Games ; Coalition Formation ; Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics ; Advances in Auctions ; Combinatorial Auctions ; Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multiunit auctions ; Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling ; Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology ; Epistemic Game Theory ; Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics ; The Complexity of Computing Equilibria ; Theory of Combinatorial Games ; Game Theory and Distributed Control ; Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility ; Calibration and Expert Testing
Control code
u396632
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (4 volumes)
File format
multiple file formats
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780444894274
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations.
Quality assurance targets
unknown
Reformatting quality
access
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1058695329

Library Locations

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