Coverart for item
The Resource Handbook of game theory with economic applications, edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart

Handbook of game theory with economic applications, edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart

Label
Handbook of game theory with economic applications
Title
Handbook of game theory with economic applications
Statement of responsibility
edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This is the first volume of the Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, to be followed by two additional volumes. Game Theory has developed greatly in the last decade, and today it is an essential tool in much of economic theory. The three volumes will cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science, and individual chapters on relations with other disciplines. The topics covered in the present volume include chess-playing computers, an introduction to the non-cooperative theory, repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, location, entry deterrence, patents, the cooperative theory and its applications, and the relation between Game Theory and ethics--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by Publisher
Cataloging source
OPELS
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Aumann, Robert J
  • Hart, Sergiu
Series statement
Handbooks in economics
Series volume
11
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Game theory
  • Economics, Mathematical
Label
Handbook of game theory with economic applications, edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart
Link
https://opac.eui.eu/client/en_GB/default/search/detailnonmodal/ent:$002f$002fSD_ILS$002f0$002fSD_ILS:396632/one
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
  • Sylvain Sorin
  • Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum
  • Shmuel Zamir
  • Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum
  • Françoise Forges
  • Noncooperative models of bargaining
  • Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
  • Strategic analysis of auctions
  • Robert Wilson
  • Location
  • Vol. 1.
  • Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse
  • Strategic models of entry deterrence
  • Robert Wilson
  • Patent licensing
  • Morton I. Kamien
  • Core and balancedness
  • Yakar Kannai
  • Axiomatizations of the core
  • Bezalel Peleg
  • Core in perfectly competitive economics
  • Game of chess
  • Robert M. Anderson
  • Core in imperfectly competitive economies
  • Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz
  • Two-sided matching
  • Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor
  • Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
  • William F. Lucas
  • Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus
  • Michael Maschler
  • Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
  • Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer
  • John C. Harsanyi
  • Games in extenive and strategic forms
  • Sergiu Hart
  • Games with perfect information
  • Jan Mycielski
  • Repeated games with complete information
Control code
u396689
Dimensions
30 cm
Extent
xvi, 733 pages
Isbn
9780444880987
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)1088477038
Label
Handbook of game theory with economic applications, edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart
Link
https://opac.eui.eu/client/en_GB/default/search/detailnonmodal/ent:$002f$002fSD_ILS$002f0$002fSD_ILS:396632/one
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and indexes
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
  • Sylvain Sorin
  • Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum
  • Shmuel Zamir
  • Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum
  • Françoise Forges
  • Noncooperative models of bargaining
  • Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
  • Strategic analysis of auctions
  • Robert Wilson
  • Location
  • Vol. 1.
  • Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse
  • Strategic models of entry deterrence
  • Robert Wilson
  • Patent licensing
  • Morton I. Kamien
  • Core and balancedness
  • Yakar Kannai
  • Axiomatizations of the core
  • Bezalel Peleg
  • Core in perfectly competitive economics
  • Game of chess
  • Robert M. Anderson
  • Core in imperfectly competitive economies
  • Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz
  • Two-sided matching
  • Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor
  • Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
  • William F. Lucas
  • Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus
  • Michael Maschler
  • Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
  • Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer
  • John C. Harsanyi
  • Games in extenive and strategic forms
  • Sergiu Hart
  • Games with perfect information
  • Jan Mycielski
  • Repeated games with complete information
Control code
u396689
Dimensions
30 cm
Extent
xvi, 733 pages
Isbn
9780444880987
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)1088477038

Library Locations

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      43.799557 11.291243
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