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The Resource Handbook of experimental economics results, edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith, (electronic resource)

Handbook of experimental economics results, edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith, (electronic resource)

Label
Handbook of experimental economics results
Title
Handbook of experimental economics results
Statement of responsibility
edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Experimental methods in economics respond to circumstances that are not completely dictated by accepted theory or outstanding problems. While the field of economics makes sharp distinctions and produces precise theory, the work of experimental economics sometimes appear blurred and may produce results that vary from strong support to little or partial support of the relevant theory. At a recent conference, a question was asked about where experimental methods might be more useful than field methods. Although many cannot be answered by experimental methods, there are questions that can only be answered by experiments. Much of the progress of experimental methods involves the posing of old or new questions in a way that experimental methods can be applied. The title of the book reflects the spirit of adventure that experimentalists share and focuses on experiments in general rather than forcing an organization into traditional categories that do not fit. The emphasis reflects the fact that the results do not necessarily demonstrate a consistent theme, but instead reflect bits and pieces of progress as opportunities to pose questions become recognized. This book is a result of an invitation sent from the editors to a broad range of experimenters asking them to write brief notes describing specific experimental results. The challenge was to produce pictures and tables that were self-contained so the reader could understand quickly the essential nature of the experiments and the results--
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OPELS
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Plott, Charles R
  • Smith, Vernon L
Series statement
  • ScienceDirect Elsevier Economics Handbooks
  • Handbooks in economics,
Series volume
[28]
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Economics
  • Economics
Label
Handbook of experimental economics results, edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith, (electronic resource)
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https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.eui.eu/handbook/handbook-of-experimental-economics-results/volumes
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Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
  • Abbreviated Contents. Introduction; Markets; Market Economics of Uncertainty and Information; General Equilibrium and the Economics of Multiple Market Systems; Games; Mechanism Design and Policy Applications; Non Market and Organizational Research; Individual Choice, Beliefs and Behavior; Methods
  • Charles R. Plott ;
  • Ch. 2.
  • From market jaws to the Newton method :
  • the geometry of how a market can solve systems of equations
  • Peter Bossaerts and Charles R. Plott ;
  • Ch. 3 :
  • Exogenous uncertainty increases the bid-ask spread in the continuous double auction
  • Vernon L. Smith and Mark van Boening ;
  • Ch. 4.
  • Zero-intelligence robots and the double auction market :
  • Part 1.
  • a graphical tour
  • Paul J. Brewer ;
  • Ch. 5.
  • Effect of non-binding price controls in double auction trading
  • Vernon L. Smith and Arlington W. Williams
  • Part 1.1.2.
  • Properties of posted offer processes.
  • Ch. 6.
  • Fairness and short run price adjustment in posted offer markets
  • Praveen Kujal and Vernon L. Smith ;
  • Markets
  • Ch. 7 :
  • Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predictions as a means of organizing behavior in posted-offer market experiments
  • Douglas D. Davis and Bart J. Wilson ;
  • Ch. 8.
  • Simulated and real buyers in posted offer markets
  • Jamie Brown Kruse ;
  • Ch. 9.
  • The performance of double-auction and posted-offer markets with advance production
  • Stuart Mestelman
  • Part 1.1.3.
  • Part 1.1.
  • Call markets and sealed bids.
  • Ch. 10.
  • Strategy-proof equilibrium behavior in two-sided auctions
  • Vernon L. Smith ;
  • Ch. 11.
  • First price independent private values auctions
  • James C. Cox
  • Part 1.1.4.
  • Alternative market institutions.
  • Ch. 12.
  • Institutional environments
  • The Walrasian auction
  • Corinne Bronfman [and others] ;
  • Ch. 13.
  • The matching market institution
  • Daniel Friedman and Changhua Rich ;
  • Ch. 14.
  • Tatonnement
  • Charles R. Plott
  • Part 1.2.
  • Imperfect competition
  • Part 1.1.1.
  • Part 1.2.1. Market power.
  • Ch. 15.
  • Wage differentials in experimental efficiency wage markets / Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter ;
  • Ch. 16.
  • The paradox of power
  • Yvonne Durham, Jack Hirshleifer and Vernon L. Smith ;
  • Ch. 17.
  • The exercise of market power in laboratory experiments
  • Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt ;
  • Ch. 18.
  • Properties of the double auction.
  • The classical experiments on Cournot oligopoly
  • Antoni Bosch-Domènech and Nicolaas J. Vriend ;
  • Ch. 19.
  • Experiments in decentralized monopoly restraint
  • James C. Cox and R. Mark Isaac
  • Part 1.2.2.
  • Collusion.
  • Ch. 20.
  • Price signaling and "cheap talk" in laboratory posted offer markets
  • Timothy N. Cason ;
  • Ch. 1.
  • Ch. 21.
  • The effects of collusion in laboratory experiments
  • Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt ;
  • Ch. 22.
  • Predatory pricing :
  • rare like a unicorn?
  • Rosario Gomez, Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt ;
  • Ch. 23.
  • Some results on anti-competitive behavior in multi-unit ascending price auctions
  • Katerina Sherstyuk
  • Properties of disequilibrium adjustment in double auction markets
  • Part 1.2.3.
  • Non-convexities.
  • Ch. 24.
  • Non-convexities, economies of scale, natural monopoly and monopolistic competition
  • Charles R. Plott ;
  • Ch. 25.
  • Avoidable cost structures and competitive market institutions
  • Mark V. Boening and Nathanial T. Wilcox
  • Ch. 28.
  • Quantitative restrictions in experimental posted-offer markets
  • Praveen Kujal ;
  • Ch. 29.
  • Price bubbles in large financial asset markets
  • Arlington W. Williams ;
  • Ch. 30.
  • Price bubbles
  • David Porter and Vernon L. Smith ;
  • Ch. 31.
  • Part 1.3.
  • Experiments with arbitrage across assets
  • Eric O'N. Fisher ;
  • Ch. 32.
  • Bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets :
  • common knowledge failure?
  • Charles Noussair and Charles Plott ;
  • Ch. 33.
  • A comparison of market institutions
  • Timothy N. Cason and Daniel Friedman ;
  • Ch. 34.
  • Dynamics of market adjustments.
  • Coordination success in non-cooperative large group market entry games
  • Amnon Rapoport and Darryl A. Seale
  • Part 2.
  • Market economics of uncertainty and information.
  • Ch. 35.
  • Learning to forecast rationally
  • Hugh Kelley and Daniel Friedman
  • Ch. 36.
  • Laboratory tests of job search models
  • James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca
  • Ch. 26.
  • Ch. 37.
  • Reciprocity and contract enforcement
  • Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr
  • Ch. 38.
  • Reciprocity in experimental markets
  • Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk
  • Ch. 39.
  • Information cascade experiments
  • Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt
  • Ch. 40.
  • Principles of market adjustment and stability
  • Markets and information aggregation mechanisms
  • Kay-Yut Chen and Charles R. Plott
  • Charles R. Plott ;
  • Ch. 27.
  • Off-floor trading, market disintegration and price volatility in bid-ask markets
  • Vernon L. Smith and Mark Van Boening ;
  • Ch. 43.
  • Price discovery and allocation in chains and networks of markets
  • Charles R. Plott and Jackie Yeung
  • Ch. 44.
  • Multiple market systems and the classical principles of price dynamics in general equilibrium
  • Charles R. Plott
  • Part 4.
  • Games
  • Part 4.1.
  • Accuracy of the Nash model.
  • Part 3.
  • Ch. 45.
  • Experimental beauty contest games :
  • levels of reasoning and convergence to equilibrium
  • Rosemarie Nagel
  • Ch. 46.
  • Reciprocity in ultimatum and dictator games :
  • an introduction
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 47.
  • Preferences and property rights in ultimatum and dictator games
  • General equilibrium and the economics of multiple market systems.
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 48.
  • Prompting strategic reasoning increases Other-regarding behavior
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 49.
  • Social distance and reciprocity in dictator games
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 50.
  • Fairness in ultimatum bargaining
  • J. Keith Murnighan
  • Ch. 41.
  • Ch. 51.
  • Coordination failure in market statistic games
  • John van Huyck and Raymond Battalio
  • Ch. 52.
  • The problem of common choice in symmetric N -person coordination games
  • Carl M. Rhodes and Rick K. Wilson
  • Ch. 53.
  • Equilibrium convergence in normal form games
  • Nicole Bouchez and Daniel Friedman
  • Ch. 54.
  • Comparative advantage and international trade
  • Analyzing choice with revealed preference :
  • is altruism rational?
  • James Andreoni and John H. Miller
  • Ch. 55.
  • Testing theories of Other-regarding behavior :
  • a sequence of four laboratory studies
  • Gary E. Bolton [and others]
  • Ch. 56.
  • Focal points and bargaining
  • Ken Binmore and Joseph Swierzbinski
  • Charles R. Plott
  • Part 4.2.
  • Alternatives to Nash.
  • Ch. 57.
  • Differences in the economic decisions of men and women :
  • experimental evidence
  • Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman
  • Ch. 58.
  • Emergent conventions in evolutionary games
  • John van Huyck
  • Ch. 59.
  • Ch. 42.
  • Self-centered fairness in games with more than two players
  • Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
  • Ch. 60.
  • Quantal response equilibria :
  • a brief synopsis
  • Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey
  • Ch. 61.
  • Logit equilibrium models of anomalous behavior :
  • what to do when the Nash equilibrium says one thing and the data say something else
  • Simon P. Anderson, Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt
  • Asset pricing
  • Part 4.3.
  • Learning in games.
  • Ch. 62.
  • Asymmetric two-person bargaining under incomplete information :
  • strategic play and adaptive learning
  • Amnon Rapoport, Terry E. Daniel and Darryl A. Seale
  • Ch. 63.
  • The effect of message space size on learning and outcomes in sender-receiver games
  • Andreas Blume, Douglas V. Dejong and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle
  • Ch. 64.
  • Peter Bossaerts
  • Learning in entry limit pricing games
  • David J. Cooper
  • Ch. 65.
  • Payoff uncertainty and cooperation in finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma games
  • Lawrence M. Kahn and J. Keith Murnighan
  • Ch. 66.
  • Learning and equilibrium in games
  • Colin F. Camerer, Teck H. Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong
  • Ch. 68.
  • The combinatorial auction
  • Stephen J. Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
  • Part 5.2.
  • Applied, problem driven.
  • Ch. 69.
  • Share trading and coupon banking interact to improve performance in emission trading markets
  • Stuart Mestelman and R. Andrew Muller
  • Ch. 70.
  • Trading institutions and emission allowances
  • Part 5.
  • Timothy N. Cason
  • Ch. 71.
  • Procurement contracting
  • James C. Cox and R. Mark Isaac
  • Ch. 72.
  • Electric power market design issues and laboratory experiments
  • Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 73.
  • Energy, reserve and adjustment market behavior with industry network, demand and generator parameters
  • mark A. Olson, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
  • Mechanism design and policy applications
  • Ch. 74.
  • Transmission constraints, incentive auction rules and trader experience in an electric power market
  • Steven Backerman, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
  • Ch. 75.
  • A smart market for the spot pricing and pricing of transmission through a power grid
  • Hung-Po Chao and Charles R. Plott
  • Part 5.3.
  • From the lab to the field.
  • Ch. 76.
  • Asset market manipulation :
  • Part 5.1.
  • a field experiment with racetrack betting
  • Colin F. Camerer
  • Ch. 77.
  • Pre-testing international climate change policies :
  • methods and results
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 78.
  • Quasi-experimental evaluation of regional employment subsidies
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 79.
  • Abstract, theory driven.
  • Field-test elicitations of demand for public goods
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 80.
  • Results from a dozen years of election futures markets research
  • Joyce Berg [and others]
  • Ch. 81.
  • Experimental evidence on the existence of hypothetical bias in value elicitation methods
  • Glenn W. Harrison and E. Elisabet Rutström
  • Ch. 67.
  • Incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods :
  • a survey of experimental research
  • Yan Chen
  • Ch. 83.
  • Differentiating altruism and reciprocity
  • Rachel T.A. Croson
  • Ch. 84.
  • Voluntary provision of public goods :
  • experimental results with interior Nash equilibria
  • Susan K. Laury and Charles A. Holt
  • Ch. 85.
  • Spiteful behavior in voluntary contribution mechanism experiments
  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo
  • Part 6.
  • Ch. 86.
  • Explaining the comparative statics in step-level public good games
  • Arthur Schram, Theo Offerman and Joep Sonnemans
  • Ch. 87.
  • Cooperation in VCM experiments :
  • results using the contribution function approach
  • Jordi Brandts and Arthur Schram
  • Ch. 88.
  • Voluntary provision of public goods
  • Kenneth S. chan, Stuart Mestelman and R. Andrew Muller
  • Non-market and organizational research.
  • Ch. 89.
  • Intrinsic motivation in a public good environment
  • Frans van Winden, Frans van Dijk and Joep Sonnemans
  • Ch. 90.
  • Theoretical explanations of treatment effects in voluntary contributions experiments
  • Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury
  • Part 6.2.
  • Committees and voting groups.
  • Ch. 91.
  • Institutional modifications of majority rule
  • Part 6.1.
  • William P. Bottom [and others]
  • Ch. 92.
  • Endogenous properties of equilibrium and disequilibrium in spatial committee games
  • Rick K. Wilson
  • Ch. 93.
  • Structure induced equilibrium in spatial committee games
  • Rick K. Wilson
  • Ch. 94.
  • Three-way experimental election results :
  • strategic voting, coordinated outcomes and Duverger's law
  • Public goods, externalities and common pools.
  • Thomas Rietz
  • Ch. 95.
  • Participation game experiments :
  • explaining voter turnout
  • Joep Sonnemans and Arthur Schram
  • Ch. 82.
  • Partners versus strangers :
  • random rematching in public goods experiments
  • James Andreoni and Rachel Croson
  • Motivation theory and experimental behavior under the decision cost hypothesis
  • Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker
  • Ch. 98.
  • Intertemporal choice under habit formation
  • Ernst Fehr and Peter K. Zych
  • Ch. 99.
  • Preference reversal :
  • now you see it, now you do not!
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 100.
  • Part 6.3.
  • The endowment effect :
  • evidence of losses valued more than gains
  • Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler
  • Ch. 101.
  • The endowment effect
  • Prveen Kujal and Vernon L. Smith
  • Ch. 102.
  • The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is not generally incentive-compatible in practice
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 103.
  • Behavior and organizations.
  • Utility maximization
  • James C. Cox
  • Ch. 104.
  • Preference reversals
  • James C. Cox
  • Ch. 105.
  • Rationality the fast and frugal way :
  • introduction
  • Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter M. Todd
  • Ch. 106.
  • Ch. 96.
  • The recognition heuristic and the less-is-more effect
  • Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer
  • Ch. 107.
  • The recognition heuristic :
  • a fast and frugal way to investment choice? Andreas Ortmann [and others]
  • Ch. 108.
  • One-reason decision making
  • Gerd Gigerenzer [and others]
  • Ch. 109.
  • Cognitive illusions reconsidered
  • Growing organizational culture in the laboratory
  • Gerd Gigerenzer [and others]
  • Ch. 110.
  • Social heuristics
  • Peter M. Todd, Jörg Rieskamp and Gerd Gigerenzer
  • Ch. 111.
  • Payoff scale effects and risk preference under rael and hypothetical conditions
  • Susan K. Laury and Charles A. Holt
  • Ch. 112.
  • Rewards and behavior in first price auctions
  • Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker
  • Colin F. Camerer and Roberto Weber
  • Ch. 113.
  • Men, women and risk aversion :
  • experimental evidence
  • Cahterine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman
  • Part 8.
  • Methods.
  • Ch. 114.
  • Experimetrics :
  • the use of market experiments to evaluate theperformance of econometric estimators
  • James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca
  • Part 7.
  • Ch. 115.
  • On the performance of the lottery procedure for controlling risk preferences
  • Joyce E. Berg, Thomas A. Rietz and John W. Dickhaut
  • Individual choice, beliefs and behavior.
  • Ch. 97.
Control code
ocn772909700
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
1st ed.
Extent
1 online resource (xliii, 1097, 31 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780444826428
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations (some color)
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)302358824
Label
Handbook of experimental economics results, edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith, (electronic resource)
Link
https://www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.eui.eu/handbook/handbook-of-experimental-economics-results/volumes
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
  • Abbreviated Contents. Introduction; Markets; Market Economics of Uncertainty and Information; General Equilibrium and the Economics of Multiple Market Systems; Games; Mechanism Design and Policy Applications; Non Market and Organizational Research; Individual Choice, Beliefs and Behavior; Methods
  • Charles R. Plott ;
  • Ch. 2.
  • From market jaws to the Newton method :
  • the geometry of how a market can solve systems of equations
  • Peter Bossaerts and Charles R. Plott ;
  • Ch. 3 :
  • Exogenous uncertainty increases the bid-ask spread in the continuous double auction
  • Vernon L. Smith and Mark van Boening ;
  • Ch. 4.
  • Zero-intelligence robots and the double auction market :
  • Part 1.
  • a graphical tour
  • Paul J. Brewer ;
  • Ch. 5.
  • Effect of non-binding price controls in double auction trading
  • Vernon L. Smith and Arlington W. Williams
  • Part 1.1.2.
  • Properties of posted offer processes.
  • Ch. 6.
  • Fairness and short run price adjustment in posted offer markets
  • Praveen Kujal and Vernon L. Smith ;
  • Markets
  • Ch. 7 :
  • Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predictions as a means of organizing behavior in posted-offer market experiments
  • Douglas D. Davis and Bart J. Wilson ;
  • Ch. 8.
  • Simulated and real buyers in posted offer markets
  • Jamie Brown Kruse ;
  • Ch. 9.
  • The performance of double-auction and posted-offer markets with advance production
  • Stuart Mestelman
  • Part 1.1.3.
  • Part 1.1.
  • Call markets and sealed bids.
  • Ch. 10.
  • Strategy-proof equilibrium behavior in two-sided auctions
  • Vernon L. Smith ;
  • Ch. 11.
  • First price independent private values auctions
  • James C. Cox
  • Part 1.1.4.
  • Alternative market institutions.
  • Ch. 12.
  • Institutional environments
  • The Walrasian auction
  • Corinne Bronfman [and others] ;
  • Ch. 13.
  • The matching market institution
  • Daniel Friedman and Changhua Rich ;
  • Ch. 14.
  • Tatonnement
  • Charles R. Plott
  • Part 1.2.
  • Imperfect competition
  • Part 1.1.1.
  • Part 1.2.1. Market power.
  • Ch. 15.
  • Wage differentials in experimental efficiency wage markets / Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter ;
  • Ch. 16.
  • The paradox of power
  • Yvonne Durham, Jack Hirshleifer and Vernon L. Smith ;
  • Ch. 17.
  • The exercise of market power in laboratory experiments
  • Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt ;
  • Ch. 18.
  • Properties of the double auction.
  • The classical experiments on Cournot oligopoly
  • Antoni Bosch-Domènech and Nicolaas J. Vriend ;
  • Ch. 19.
  • Experiments in decentralized monopoly restraint
  • James C. Cox and R. Mark Isaac
  • Part 1.2.2.
  • Collusion.
  • Ch. 20.
  • Price signaling and "cheap talk" in laboratory posted offer markets
  • Timothy N. Cason ;
  • Ch. 1.
  • Ch. 21.
  • The effects of collusion in laboratory experiments
  • Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt ;
  • Ch. 22.
  • Predatory pricing :
  • rare like a unicorn?
  • Rosario Gomez, Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt ;
  • Ch. 23.
  • Some results on anti-competitive behavior in multi-unit ascending price auctions
  • Katerina Sherstyuk
  • Properties of disequilibrium adjustment in double auction markets
  • Part 1.2.3.
  • Non-convexities.
  • Ch. 24.
  • Non-convexities, economies of scale, natural monopoly and monopolistic competition
  • Charles R. Plott ;
  • Ch. 25.
  • Avoidable cost structures and competitive market institutions
  • Mark V. Boening and Nathanial T. Wilcox
  • Ch. 28.
  • Quantitative restrictions in experimental posted-offer markets
  • Praveen Kujal ;
  • Ch. 29.
  • Price bubbles in large financial asset markets
  • Arlington W. Williams ;
  • Ch. 30.
  • Price bubbles
  • David Porter and Vernon L. Smith ;
  • Ch. 31.
  • Part 1.3.
  • Experiments with arbitrage across assets
  • Eric O'N. Fisher ;
  • Ch. 32.
  • Bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets :
  • common knowledge failure?
  • Charles Noussair and Charles Plott ;
  • Ch. 33.
  • A comparison of market institutions
  • Timothy N. Cason and Daniel Friedman ;
  • Ch. 34.
  • Dynamics of market adjustments.
  • Coordination success in non-cooperative large group market entry games
  • Amnon Rapoport and Darryl A. Seale
  • Part 2.
  • Market economics of uncertainty and information.
  • Ch. 35.
  • Learning to forecast rationally
  • Hugh Kelley and Daniel Friedman
  • Ch. 36.
  • Laboratory tests of job search models
  • James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca
  • Ch. 26.
  • Ch. 37.
  • Reciprocity and contract enforcement
  • Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr
  • Ch. 38.
  • Reciprocity in experimental markets
  • Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk
  • Ch. 39.
  • Information cascade experiments
  • Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt
  • Ch. 40.
  • Principles of market adjustment and stability
  • Markets and information aggregation mechanisms
  • Kay-Yut Chen and Charles R. Plott
  • Charles R. Plott ;
  • Ch. 27.
  • Off-floor trading, market disintegration and price volatility in bid-ask markets
  • Vernon L. Smith and Mark Van Boening ;
  • Ch. 43.
  • Price discovery and allocation in chains and networks of markets
  • Charles R. Plott and Jackie Yeung
  • Ch. 44.
  • Multiple market systems and the classical principles of price dynamics in general equilibrium
  • Charles R. Plott
  • Part 4.
  • Games
  • Part 4.1.
  • Accuracy of the Nash model.
  • Part 3.
  • Ch. 45.
  • Experimental beauty contest games :
  • levels of reasoning and convergence to equilibrium
  • Rosemarie Nagel
  • Ch. 46.
  • Reciprocity in ultimatum and dictator games :
  • an introduction
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 47.
  • Preferences and property rights in ultimatum and dictator games
  • General equilibrium and the economics of multiple market systems.
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 48.
  • Prompting strategic reasoning increases Other-regarding behavior
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 49.
  • Social distance and reciprocity in dictator games
  • Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 50.
  • Fairness in ultimatum bargaining
  • J. Keith Murnighan
  • Ch. 41.
  • Ch. 51.
  • Coordination failure in market statistic games
  • John van Huyck and Raymond Battalio
  • Ch. 52.
  • The problem of common choice in symmetric N -person coordination games
  • Carl M. Rhodes and Rick K. Wilson
  • Ch. 53.
  • Equilibrium convergence in normal form games
  • Nicole Bouchez and Daniel Friedman
  • Ch. 54.
  • Comparative advantage and international trade
  • Analyzing choice with revealed preference :
  • is altruism rational?
  • James Andreoni and John H. Miller
  • Ch. 55.
  • Testing theories of Other-regarding behavior :
  • a sequence of four laboratory studies
  • Gary E. Bolton [and others]
  • Ch. 56.
  • Focal points and bargaining
  • Ken Binmore and Joseph Swierzbinski
  • Charles R. Plott
  • Part 4.2.
  • Alternatives to Nash.
  • Ch. 57.
  • Differences in the economic decisions of men and women :
  • experimental evidence
  • Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman
  • Ch. 58.
  • Emergent conventions in evolutionary games
  • John van Huyck
  • Ch. 59.
  • Ch. 42.
  • Self-centered fairness in games with more than two players
  • Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels
  • Ch. 60.
  • Quantal response equilibria :
  • a brief synopsis
  • Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey
  • Ch. 61.
  • Logit equilibrium models of anomalous behavior :
  • what to do when the Nash equilibrium says one thing and the data say something else
  • Simon P. Anderson, Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt
  • Asset pricing
  • Part 4.3.
  • Learning in games.
  • Ch. 62.
  • Asymmetric two-person bargaining under incomplete information :
  • strategic play and adaptive learning
  • Amnon Rapoport, Terry E. Daniel and Darryl A. Seale
  • Ch. 63.
  • The effect of message space size on learning and outcomes in sender-receiver games
  • Andreas Blume, Douglas V. Dejong and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle
  • Ch. 64.
  • Peter Bossaerts
  • Learning in entry limit pricing games
  • David J. Cooper
  • Ch. 65.
  • Payoff uncertainty and cooperation in finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma games
  • Lawrence M. Kahn and J. Keith Murnighan
  • Ch. 66.
  • Learning and equilibrium in games
  • Colin F. Camerer, Teck H. Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong
  • Ch. 68.
  • The combinatorial auction
  • Stephen J. Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
  • Part 5.2.
  • Applied, problem driven.
  • Ch. 69.
  • Share trading and coupon banking interact to improve performance in emission trading markets
  • Stuart Mestelman and R. Andrew Muller
  • Ch. 70.
  • Trading institutions and emission allowances
  • Part 5.
  • Timothy N. Cason
  • Ch. 71.
  • Procurement contracting
  • James C. Cox and R. Mark Isaac
  • Ch. 72.
  • Electric power market design issues and laboratory experiments
  • Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith
  • Ch. 73.
  • Energy, reserve and adjustment market behavior with industry network, demand and generator parameters
  • mark A. Olson, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
  • Mechanism design and policy applications
  • Ch. 74.
  • Transmission constraints, incentive auction rules and trader experience in an electric power market
  • Steven Backerman, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon L. Smith
  • Ch. 75.
  • A smart market for the spot pricing and pricing of transmission through a power grid
  • Hung-Po Chao and Charles R. Plott
  • Part 5.3.
  • From the lab to the field.
  • Ch. 76.
  • Asset market manipulation :
  • Part 5.1.
  • a field experiment with racetrack betting
  • Colin F. Camerer
  • Ch. 77.
  • Pre-testing international climate change policies :
  • methods and results
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 78.
  • Quasi-experimental evaluation of regional employment subsidies
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 79.
  • Abstract, theory driven.
  • Field-test elicitations of demand for public goods
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 80.
  • Results from a dozen years of election futures markets research
  • Joyce Berg [and others]
  • Ch. 81.
  • Experimental evidence on the existence of hypothetical bias in value elicitation methods
  • Glenn W. Harrison and E. Elisabet Rutström
  • Ch. 67.
  • Incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public goods :
  • a survey of experimental research
  • Yan Chen
  • Ch. 83.
  • Differentiating altruism and reciprocity
  • Rachel T.A. Croson
  • Ch. 84.
  • Voluntary provision of public goods :
  • experimental results with interior Nash equilibria
  • Susan K. Laury and Charles A. Holt
  • Ch. 85.
  • Spiteful behavior in voluntary contribution mechanism experiments
  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo
  • Part 6.
  • Ch. 86.
  • Explaining the comparative statics in step-level public good games
  • Arthur Schram, Theo Offerman and Joep Sonnemans
  • Ch. 87.
  • Cooperation in VCM experiments :
  • results using the contribution function approach
  • Jordi Brandts and Arthur Schram
  • Ch. 88.
  • Voluntary provision of public goods
  • Kenneth S. chan, Stuart Mestelman and R. Andrew Muller
  • Non-market and organizational research.
  • Ch. 89.
  • Intrinsic motivation in a public good environment
  • Frans van Winden, Frans van Dijk and Joep Sonnemans
  • Ch. 90.
  • Theoretical explanations of treatment effects in voluntary contributions experiments
  • Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury
  • Part 6.2.
  • Committees and voting groups.
  • Ch. 91.
  • Institutional modifications of majority rule
  • Part 6.1.
  • William P. Bottom [and others]
  • Ch. 92.
  • Endogenous properties of equilibrium and disequilibrium in spatial committee games
  • Rick K. Wilson
  • Ch. 93.
  • Structure induced equilibrium in spatial committee games
  • Rick K. Wilson
  • Ch. 94.
  • Three-way experimental election results :
  • strategic voting, coordinated outcomes and Duverger's law
  • Public goods, externalities and common pools.
  • Thomas Rietz
  • Ch. 95.
  • Participation game experiments :
  • explaining voter turnout
  • Joep Sonnemans and Arthur Schram
  • Ch. 82.
  • Partners versus strangers :
  • random rematching in public goods experiments
  • James Andreoni and Rachel Croson
  • Motivation theory and experimental behavior under the decision cost hypothesis
  • Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker
  • Ch. 98.
  • Intertemporal choice under habit formation
  • Ernst Fehr and Peter K. Zych
  • Ch. 99.
  • Preference reversal :
  • now you see it, now you do not!
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 100.
  • Part 6.3.
  • The endowment effect :
  • evidence of losses valued more than gains
  • Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler
  • Ch. 101.
  • The endowment effect
  • Prveen Kujal and Vernon L. Smith
  • Ch. 102.
  • The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism is not generally incentive-compatible in practice
  • Peter Bohm
  • Ch. 103.
  • Behavior and organizations.
  • Utility maximization
  • James C. Cox
  • Ch. 104.
  • Preference reversals
  • James C. Cox
  • Ch. 105.
  • Rationality the fast and frugal way :
  • introduction
  • Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter M. Todd
  • Ch. 106.
  • Ch. 96.
  • The recognition heuristic and the less-is-more effect
  • Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer
  • Ch. 107.
  • The recognition heuristic :
  • a fast and frugal way to investment choice? Andreas Ortmann [and others]
  • Ch. 108.
  • One-reason decision making
  • Gerd Gigerenzer [and others]
  • Ch. 109.
  • Cognitive illusions reconsidered
  • Growing organizational culture in the laboratory
  • Gerd Gigerenzer [and others]
  • Ch. 110.
  • Social heuristics
  • Peter M. Todd, Jörg Rieskamp and Gerd Gigerenzer
  • Ch. 111.
  • Payoff scale effects and risk preference under rael and hypothetical conditions
  • Susan K. Laury and Charles A. Holt
  • Ch. 112.
  • Rewards and behavior in first price auctions
  • Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker
  • Colin F. Camerer and Roberto Weber
  • Ch. 113.
  • Men, women and risk aversion :
  • experimental evidence
  • Cahterine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman
  • Part 8.
  • Methods.
  • Ch. 114.
  • Experimetrics :
  • the use of market experiments to evaluate theperformance of econometric estimators
  • James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca
  • Part 7.
  • Ch. 115.
  • On the performance of the lottery procedure for controlling risk preferences
  • Joyce E. Berg, Thomas A. Rietz and John W. Dickhaut
  • Individual choice, beliefs and behavior.
  • Ch. 97.
Control code
ocn772909700
Dimensions
unknown
Edition
1st ed.
Extent
1 online resource (xliii, 1097, 31 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780444826428
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations (some color)
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)302358824

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