Coverart for item
The Resource Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America, Alisha C. Holland, (electronic resource)

Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America, Alisha C. Holland, (electronic resource)

Label
Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America
Title
Forbearance as redistribution
Title remainder
the politics of informal welfare in Latin America
Statement of responsibility
Alisha C. Holland
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
  • "Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"--
  • "The Politics of Informal Welfare in Latin America Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"--
Member of
Assigning source
  • Provided by publisher
  • Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Holland, Alisha
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
Series statement
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Politics, Practical
  • Public officers
  • Public welfare
  • Distributive justice
  • Latin America
  • Latin America
Label
Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America, Alisha C. Holland, (electronic resource)
Link
http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316795613
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Machine generated contents note: 1. An electoral theory of forbearance; 2. Who votes for forbearance; 3. What enables forbearance: inadequate social policy and squatting; 4. When politicians choose forbearance: core constituencies and street vending; 5. Where forbearance occurs: the role of electoral institutions; 6; Why forbearance continues: path dependencies in the informal welfare state; 7. How forbearance ends: lessons from Turkey
Control code
CR9781316795613
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xii, 380 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9781316795613
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1027145649
Label
Forbearance as redistribution : the politics of informal welfare in Latin America, Alisha C. Holland, (electronic resource)
Link
http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316795613
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Machine generated contents note: 1. An electoral theory of forbearance; 2. Who votes for forbearance; 3. What enables forbearance: inadequate social policy and squatting; 4. When politicians choose forbearance: core constituencies and street vending; 5. Where forbearance occurs: the role of electoral institutions; 6; Why forbearance continues: path dependencies in the informal welfare state; 7. How forbearance ends: lessons from Turkey
Control code
CR9781316795613
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xii, 380 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9781316795613
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1027145649

Library Locations

    • Badia FiesolanaBorrow it
      Via dei Roccettini 9, San Domenico di Fiesole, 50014, IT
      43.803074 11.283055
Processing Feedback ...