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The Resource Essays on cartels and competition policy, Carmen García Galindo

Essays on cartels and competition policy, Carmen García Galindo

Creator
Contributor
Summary
The aim of this thesis is to investigate cartels and the impact of competition policy from various angles. Chapter 1, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro and Juan Luis Jiménez, analyzes the relationship between cartel life cycles and business cycles. We analyze the relationship between cartel startups/breakups and economic cycles using a dataset of cartels sanctioned by the European Commission. Results show that cartels are more likely to be formed when the business has evolved positively in the previous months and managers expect prices to decline, but that cartels also tend to breakup when the business has evolved positively. Upturns in firm-specific business cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die while new ones are set up. Chapter 2 aims at obtaining a precise measure of how much firms benefit from collusion. I evaluate the causal effect of being a cartel member on the revenues and profits of cartelized firms, using comparable non-collusive firms as control group. A dataset of discovered cartel cases in Spain from 1990 to 2014 and an alternative dataset of firms' balance sheets are used. Results show that firms increase their revenues, on average, between 19\% and 26\% due to the collusive agreement, while no significant effect is found on profits. Estimations by cartel duration demonstrate that the members of long-lasting cartels not only increase their revenues (29\%-50\%), but also their profits more than two times. Further analysis shows that cartels that are profitable from the beginning tend to last longer and do not apply for Leniency Programs. Chapter 3, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, Juan Luis Jiménez and José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, investigates how Leniency Programs destabilize cartels. We study the effect of the Leniency Program on cartel duration, cartel fines and on the years of investigation using a difference-in-differences program evaluation approach. Cartel cases discovered by the European Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority are analyzed. Results show a short-run effect of the Leniency Program: the detected cartels have longer duration than the ones in the control group. In the long run, the program decreases cartel duration. On the other hand, no significant effect is found on fines, while the duration of the investigation decreases significantly around 0.8-1.3 years
Language
eng
Work
Publication
Extent
vii, 92 pages
Note
Examining board: Professor David K. Levine, EUI, Supervisor; Professor Giacomo Calzolari, EUI; Professor Juan-José Ganuza, UPF and Barcelona GSE; Professor Gerard Llobet, CEMFI
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/59224
Instance
Label
Essays on cartels and competition policy
Title
Essays on cartels and competition policy
Statement of responsibility
Carmen García Galindo
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
The aim of this thesis is to investigate cartels and the impact of competition policy from various angles. Chapter 1, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro and Juan Luis Jiménez, analyzes the relationship between cartel life cycles and business cycles. We analyze the relationship between cartel startups/breakups and economic cycles using a dataset of cartels sanctioned by the European Commission. Results show that cartels are more likely to be formed when the business has evolved positively in the previous months and managers expect prices to decline, but that cartels also tend to breakup when the business has evolved positively. Upturns in firm-specific business cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die while new ones are set up. Chapter 2 aims at obtaining a precise measure of how much firms benefit from collusion. I evaluate the causal effect of being a cartel member on the revenues and profits of cartelized firms, using comparable non-collusive firms as control group. A dataset of discovered cartel cases in Spain from 1990 to 2014 and an alternative dataset of firms' balance sheets are used. Results show that firms increase their revenues, on average, between 19\% and 26\% due to the collusive agreement, while no significant effect is found on profits. Estimations by cartel duration demonstrate that the members of long-lasting cartels not only increase their revenues (29\%-50\%), but also their profits more than two times. Further analysis shows that cartels that are profitable from the beginning tend to last longer and do not apply for Leniency Programs. Chapter 3, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, Juan Luis Jiménez and José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro, investigates how Leniency Programs destabilize cartels. We study the effect of the Leniency Program on cartel duration, cartel fines and on the years of investigation using a difference-in-differences program evaluation approach. Cartel cases discovered by the European Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority are analyzed. Results show a short-run effect of the Leniency Program: the detected cartels have longer duration than the ones in the control group. In the long run, the program decreases cartel duration. On the other hand, no significant effect is found on fines, while the duration of the investigation decreases significantly around 0.8-1.3 years
Cataloging source
FIE
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
García Galindo, Carmen
Date time place
Defence date: 3 October 2018
Dissertation note
Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (ECO), 2018.
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
theses
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
European University Institute
Series statement
  • EUI PhD theses.
  • EUI theses
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Cartels
  • Competition
  • Industrial policy
Label
Essays on cartels and competition policy, Carmen García Galindo
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/59224
Instantiates
Publication
Note
Examining board: Professor David K. Levine, EUI, Supervisor; Professor Giacomo Calzolari, EUI; Professor Juan-José Ganuza, UPF and Barcelona GSE; Professor Gerard Llobet, CEMFI
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 87 - 88)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
vii, 92 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
System control number
(OCoLC)1078565694
Label
Essays on cartels and competition policy, Carmen García Galindo
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/59224
Publication
Note
Examining board: Professor David K. Levine, EUI, Supervisor; Professor Giacomo Calzolari, EUI; Professor Juan-José Ganuza, UPF and Barcelona GSE; Professor Gerard Llobet, CEMFI
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 87 - 88)
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
vii, 92 pages
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
System control number
(OCoLC)1078565694

Subject

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