Coverart for item
The Resource Delegation and agency in international organizations, edited by Darren G. Hawkins [and others], (electronic resource)

Delegation and agency in international organizations, edited by Darren G. Hawkins [and others], (electronic resource)

Label
Delegation and agency in international organizations
Title
Delegation and agency in international organizations
Statement of responsibility
edited by Darren G. Hawkins [and others]
Title variation
Delegation & Agency in International Organizations
Contributor
Editor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
UkCbUP
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorDate
1966-
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Hawkins, Darren G.
Series statement
  • Political economy of institutions and decisions
  • Cambridge Social Sciences eBooks
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • International organization
  • International agencies
  • International relations
  • Delegation of authority
Label
Delegation and agency in international organizations, edited by Darren G. Hawkins [and others], (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491368
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits -- Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy / J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes -- Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems / Helen V. Milner -- Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality / Lisa L. Martin -- Delegation and discretion in the European Union / Mark A. Pollack -- Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability -- How agents matter / Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby -- Screening power : international organizations as informative agents / Alexander Thompson -- Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO / Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson -- Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity / Erica R. Gould -- Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power / Karen J. Alter -- Directions for future research -- The logic of delegation to international organizations / David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins
Control code
CR9780511491368
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xvi, 406 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780521862097
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1097117381
Label
Delegation and agency in international organizations, edited by Darren G. Hawkins [and others], (electronic resource)
Link
https://eui.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491368
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits -- Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy / J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes -- Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems / Helen V. Milner -- Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality / Lisa L. Martin -- Delegation and discretion in the European Union / Mark A. Pollack -- Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability -- How agents matter / Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby -- Screening power : international organizations as informative agents / Alexander Thompson -- Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO / Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson -- Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity / Erica R. Gould -- Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power / Karen J. Alter -- Directions for future research -- The logic of delegation to international organizations / David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins
Control code
CR9780511491368
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xvi, 406 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9780521862097
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1097117381

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