Coverart for item
The Resource Covenants and Third-Party Creditors : Empirical and Law & Economics Insights Into a Common Pool Problem, by Daniela Matri, (electronic resource)

Covenants and Third-Party Creditors : Empirical and Law & Economics Insights Into a Common Pool Problem, by Daniela Matri, (electronic resource)

Label
Covenants and Third-Party Creditors : Empirical and Law & Economics Insights Into a Common Pool Problem
Title
Covenants and Third-Party Creditors
Title remainder
Empirical and Law & Economics Insights Into a Common Pool Problem
Statement of responsibility
by Daniela Matri
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This book adds to the debate on the effects of covenants on third-party creditors (externalities), which have recently become a focus of discussion in the contexts of bankruptcy law, corporate law and corporate governance. The general thrust of the debate is that negative effects on third-party creditors predominate because banks act in their own self-interest. After systematising the debated potential positive and negative externalities of covenants, the book empirically examines these externalities: It investigates the banks’ factual conduct and its effects on third-party creditors in Germany and the US. The study’s most significant outcome is that it disproves the assumption that banks disregard third-party creditors’ interests. These findings are then interpreted with the tools of economic analysis; particularly, with the concept of common pool resources (CPRs). Around the aggregated value of the debtor company’s asset pool (as CPR) exists an n-person prisoner’s dilemma between banks and third-party creditors: No creditor knows when and under what conditions the other creditor will appropriate funds from the debtor company’s asset pool. This coordination problem is traditionally addressed by means of bankruptcy law and collaterals. However, the incentive structure that surrounds the bilateral private governance system created by covenants and an event of default clause (a CPR private governance system) is found to also be capable of tackling this problem. Moreover, the interaction between the different regulation spheres – bankruptcy law, collateral and the CPR private governance system − has important implications for both the aforementioned discussions as well as the legal treatment of covenants and event of default clauses. Covenants alone cannot be seen as an alternative to institutional regulation; the complete CPR private governance system and its interaction with institutional regulation must also be taken into consideration. In addition, their function must first find more acceptance and respect in the legal treatment of covenants and event of default clauses: The CPR private governance system fills a gap in the regulation of the tragedy of the commons by bankruptcy law and collateral. This has particularly important implications for the German § 138 BGB, § 826 BGB and ad hoc duties to disclose insider information.--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Matri, Daniela
Dewey number
340.9
Image bit depth
0
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Series statement
Springer eBooks
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Law
  • Business enterprises
  • Corporations
  • Commercial law
  • Private international law
  • Conflict of laws
  • International law
  • Comparative law
  • Trade
  • Law and economics
Label
Covenants and Third-Party Creditors : Empirical and Law & Economics Insights Into a Common Pool Problem, by Daniela Matri, (electronic resource)
Link
http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62036-7
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
mixed
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
not applicable
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Part I ─ Theoretical Framework and Development of Research Question: 1 Introduction ─ Covenants and Third-party Creditors -- 2 Self-help Devices of Creditor Protection -- 3 Covenants and Bilateral Creditor Protection -- Part II ─ The Systematisation of Third-party Creditor Effects of Covenants: Preliminary Framework: 4 Academic Discussion and the Relevance of Third-party Creditor Protection -- 5 Potential Externalities of the Bilateral Governance System -- 6 The Self-interested Behaviour of Banks and Its Legal Limits -- Part III ─ Empirical Research: Results and Re-evaluation of Preliminary Theory: 7 Design and Methodology -- 8 Results ─ Covenants as a Reciprocal Private Governance Creditor Protection System -- 9 Re-evaluation − Collectivisation of Creditor Protection Through Private Governance -- 10 Consequences for Legal Discussion -- Part IV ─ Summary and Outlook: 11 Summary -- 12 Outlook
Control code
978-3-319-62036-7
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (XVII, 265 pages)
File format
multiple file formats
Form of item
  • online
  • electronic
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9783319620367
Level of compression
uncompressed
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other control number
10.1007/978-3-319-62036-7
Other physical details
7 illustrations, 4 illustrations in color.
Quality assurance targets
absent
Reformatting quality
access
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1007303751
Label
Covenants and Third-Party Creditors : Empirical and Law & Economics Insights Into a Common Pool Problem, by Daniela Matri, (electronic resource)
Link
http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62036-7
Publication
Antecedent source
mixed
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
not applicable
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Part I ─ Theoretical Framework and Development of Research Question: 1 Introduction ─ Covenants and Third-party Creditors -- 2 Self-help Devices of Creditor Protection -- 3 Covenants and Bilateral Creditor Protection -- Part II ─ The Systematisation of Third-party Creditor Effects of Covenants: Preliminary Framework: 4 Academic Discussion and the Relevance of Third-party Creditor Protection -- 5 Potential Externalities of the Bilateral Governance System -- 6 The Self-interested Behaviour of Banks and Its Legal Limits -- Part III ─ Empirical Research: Results and Re-evaluation of Preliminary Theory: 7 Design and Methodology -- 8 Results ─ Covenants as a Reciprocal Private Governance Creditor Protection System -- 9 Re-evaluation − Collectivisation of Creditor Protection Through Private Governance -- 10 Consequences for Legal Discussion -- Part IV ─ Summary and Outlook: 11 Summary -- 12 Outlook
Control code
978-3-319-62036-7
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (XVII, 265 pages)
File format
multiple file formats
Form of item
  • online
  • electronic
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9783319620367
Level of compression
uncompressed
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other control number
10.1007/978-3-319-62036-7
Other physical details
7 illustrations, 4 illustrations in color.
Quality assurance targets
absent
Reformatting quality
access
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)1007303751

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