The Resource Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood
Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood
Resource Information
The item Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute Library.This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
Resource Information
The item Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood represents a specific, individual, material embodiment of a distinct intellectual or artistic creation found in European University Institute Library.
This item is available to borrow from 1 library branch.
- Summary
- The Federal Reserve System, which has been Congress's agent for the control of money since 1913, has a mixed reputation. Its errors have been huge. It was the principal cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the inflation of the 1970s, and participated in the massive bailouts of financial institutions at taxpayers' expense during the recent Great Recession. This book is a study of the causes of the Fed's errors, with lessons for an improved monetary authority, beginning with an examination of the history of central banks, in which it is found that their performance depended on their incentives, as is to be expected of economic agents. An implication of these findings is that the Fed's failings must be traced to its institutional independence, particularly of the public welfare. Consequently, its policies have been dictated by special interests: financial institutions who desire public support without meaningful regulation, as well as presidents and those portions of Congress desiring growing government financed by inflation. Monetary stability (which used to be thought the primary purpose of central banks) requires responsibility, meaning punishment for failure, instead of a remote and irresponsible (to the public) agency such as the Fed. It requires either private money motivated by profit or Congress disciplined by the electoral system as before 1913. Change involving the least disturbance to the system suggests the latter.--
- Language
- eng
- Extent
- xx, 222 pages
- Contents
-
- Introduction
- Early central banks
- Central banking in the United States, 1847-1913
- The Federal Reserve sysyem, 1913-51
- The Federal Reserve, 1951-99
- The Great Recession
- Bank regulation
- Conclusion : the necessity and possibility of replacing the Fed
- Isbn
- 9781138016392
- Label
- Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives
- Title
- Central banking in a democracy
- Title remainder
- the Federal Reserve and its alternatives
- Statement of responsibility
- John H. Wood
- Language
- eng
- Summary
- The Federal Reserve System, which has been Congress's agent for the control of money since 1913, has a mixed reputation. Its errors have been huge. It was the principal cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the inflation of the 1970s, and participated in the massive bailouts of financial institutions at taxpayers' expense during the recent Great Recession. This book is a study of the causes of the Fed's errors, with lessons for an improved monetary authority, beginning with an examination of the history of central banks, in which it is found that their performance depended on their incentives, as is to be expected of economic agents. An implication of these findings is that the Fed's failings must be traced to its institutional independence, particularly of the public welfare. Consequently, its policies have been dictated by special interests: financial institutions who desire public support without meaningful regulation, as well as presidents and those portions of Congress desiring growing government financed by inflation. Monetary stability (which used to be thought the primary purpose of central banks) requires responsibility, meaning punishment for failure, instead of a remote and irresponsible (to the public) agency such as the Fed. It requires either private money motivated by profit or Congress disciplined by the electoral system as before 1913. Change involving the least disturbance to the system suggests the latter.--
- Assigning source
- Provided by Publisher
- Cataloging source
- YDXCP
- http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
- Wood, John H.
- Illustrations
- illustrations
- Index
- index present
- Literary form
- non fiction
- Nature of contents
- bibliography
- Series statement
- Routledge explorations in economic history
- Series volume
- 60
- http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
-
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
- Monetary policy
- Banks and banking, Central
- Label
- Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references and index
- Carrier category
- volume
- Carrier category code
-
- nc
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier.
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent.
- Contents
- Introduction -- Early central banks -- Central banking in the United States, 1847-1913 -- The Federal Reserve sysyem, 1913-51 -- The Federal Reserve, 1951-99 -- The Great Recession -- Bank regulation -- Conclusion : the necessity and possibility of replacing the Fed
- Control code
- FIEb17612767
- Dimensions
- 24 cm.
- Extent
- xx, 222 pages
- Isbn
- 9781138016392
- Media category
- unmediated
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia.
- Media type code
-
- n
- System control number
- (OCoLC)879983390
- Label
- Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood
- Bibliography note
- Includes bibliographical references and index
- Carrier category
- volume
- Carrier category code
-
- nc
- Carrier MARC source
- rdacarrier.
- Content category
- text
- Content type code
-
- txt
- Content type MARC source
- rdacontent.
- Contents
- Introduction -- Early central banks -- Central banking in the United States, 1847-1913 -- The Federal Reserve sysyem, 1913-51 -- The Federal Reserve, 1951-99 -- The Great Recession -- Bank regulation -- Conclusion : the necessity and possibility of replacing the Fed
- Control code
- FIEb17612767
- Dimensions
- 24 cm.
- Extent
- xx, 222 pages
- Isbn
- 9781138016392
- Media category
- unmediated
- Media MARC source
- rdamedia.
- Media type code
-
- n
- System control number
- (OCoLC)879983390
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<div class="citation" vocab="http://schema.org/"><i class="fa fa-external-link-square fa-fw"></i> Data from <span resource="http://link.library.eui.eu/portal/Central-banking-in-a-democracy--the-Federal/RmU7HaX6eOs/" typeof="Book http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/Item"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a href="http://link.library.eui.eu/portal/Central-banking-in-a-democracy--the-Federal/RmU7HaX6eOs/">Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood</a></span> - <span property="potentialAction" typeOf="OrganizeAction"><span property="agent" typeof="LibrarySystem http://library.link/vocab/LibrarySystem" resource="http://link.library.eui.eu/"><span property="name http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/label"><a property="url" href="http://link.library.eui.eu/">European University Institute Library</a></span></span></span></span></div>