Borrow it
Coverart for item
The Resource Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood

Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood

Creator
Summary
The Federal Reserve System, which has been Congress's agent for the control of money since 1913, has a mixed reputation. Its errors have been huge. It was the principal cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the inflation of the 1970s, and participated in the massive bailouts of financial institutions at taxpayers' expense during the recent Great Recession. This book is a study of the causes of the Fed's errors, with lessons for an improved monetary authority, beginning with an examination of the history of central banks, in which it is found that their performance depended on their incentives, as is to be expected of economic agents. An implication of these findings is that the Fed's failings must be traced to its institutional independence, particularly of the public welfare. Consequently, its policies have been dictated by special interests: financial institutions who desire public support without meaningful regulation, as well as presidents and those portions of Congress desiring growing government financed by inflation. Monetary stability (which used to be thought the primary purpose of central banks) requires responsibility, meaning punishment for failure, instead of a remote and irresponsible (to the public) agency such as the Fed. It requires either private money motivated by profit or Congress disciplined by the electoral system as before 1913. Change involving the least disturbance to the system suggests the latter.--
Language
eng
Work
Publication
Extent
xx, 222 pages
Contents
  • Introduction
  • Early central banks
  • Central banking in the United States, 1847-1913
  • The Federal Reserve sysyem, 1913-51
  • The Federal Reserve, 1951-99
  • The Great Recession
  • Bank regulation
  • Conclusion : the necessity and possibility of replacing the Fed
Isbn
9781138016392
Instance
Label
Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives
Title
Central banking in a democracy
Title remainder
the Federal Reserve and its alternatives
Statement of responsibility
John H. Wood
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
The Federal Reserve System, which has been Congress's agent for the control of money since 1913, has a mixed reputation. Its errors have been huge. It was the principal cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the inflation of the 1970s, and participated in the massive bailouts of financial institutions at taxpayers' expense during the recent Great Recession. This book is a study of the causes of the Fed's errors, with lessons for an improved monetary authority, beginning with an examination of the history of central banks, in which it is found that their performance depended on their incentives, as is to be expected of economic agents. An implication of these findings is that the Fed's failings must be traced to its institutional independence, particularly of the public welfare. Consequently, its policies have been dictated by special interests: financial institutions who desire public support without meaningful regulation, as well as presidents and those portions of Congress desiring growing government financed by inflation. Monetary stability (which used to be thought the primary purpose of central banks) requires responsibility, meaning punishment for failure, instead of a remote and irresponsible (to the public) agency such as the Fed. It requires either private money motivated by profit or Congress disciplined by the electoral system as before 1913. Change involving the least disturbance to the system suggests the latter.--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by Publisher
Cataloging source
YDXCP
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Wood, John H.
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
Series statement
Routledge explorations in economic history
Series volume
60
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
  • Monetary policy
  • Banks and banking, Central
Label
Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
Introduction -- Early central banks -- Central banking in the United States, 1847-1913 -- The Federal Reserve sysyem, 1913-51 -- The Federal Reserve, 1951-99 -- The Great Recession -- Bank regulation -- Conclusion : the necessity and possibility of replacing the Fed
Control code
FIEb17612767
Dimensions
24 cm.
Extent
xx, 222 pages
Isbn
9781138016392
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
n
System control number
(OCoLC)879983390
Label
Central banking in a democracy : the Federal Reserve and its alternatives, John H. Wood
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier.
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent.
Contents
Introduction -- Early central banks -- Central banking in the United States, 1847-1913 -- The Federal Reserve sysyem, 1913-51 -- The Federal Reserve, 1951-99 -- The Great Recession -- Bank regulation -- Conclusion : the necessity and possibility of replacing the Fed
Control code
FIEb17612767
Dimensions
24 cm.
Extent
xx, 222 pages
Isbn
9781138016392
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia.
Media type code
n
System control number
(OCoLC)879983390

Subject

Member of

Library Locations

    • Badia FiesolanaBorrow it
      Via dei Roccettini 9, San Domenico di Fiesole, 50014, IT
      43.803074 11.283055

Library Links

Structured data from the Bibframe namespace is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License by European University Institute. Additional terms may apply to data associated with third party namespaces.
Processing Feedback ...