Coverart for item
The Resource Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Christopher Adolph, (electronic resource)

Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Christopher Adolph, (electronic resource)

Label
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality
Title
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics
Title remainder
the myth of neutrality
Statement of responsibility
Christopher Adolph
Title variation
Bankers, Bureaucrats, & Central Bank Politics
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.--
Member of
Assigning source
Provided by publisher
Cataloging source
UkCbUP
http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
1976-
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Adolph, Christopher
Index
index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
dictionaries
Series statement
  • Cambridge studies in comparative politics
  • Cambridge Social Sciences eBooks
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Monetary policy
  • Banks and banking, Central
  • Bureaucracy
Label
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Christopher Adolph, (electronic resource)
Link
http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139506762
Instantiates
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- Career theories of monetary policy -- Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- Careers and the monetary policy process: three mechanism tests -- Careers and inflation in developing countries -- How central bankers use their independence -- Partisan governments, labor unions and monetary policy -- The politics of central banker appointment -- The politics of central banker tenure -- Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion
Control code
CR9781139506762
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9781107567092
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)844940155
Label
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality, Christopher Adolph, (electronic resource)
Link
http://ezproxy.eui.eu/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139506762
Publication
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- Career theories of monetary policy -- Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- Careers and the monetary policy process: three mechanism tests -- Careers and inflation in developing countries -- How central bankers use their independence -- Partisan governments, labor unions and monetary policy -- The politics of central banker appointment -- The politics of central banker tenure -- Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion
Control code
CR9781139506762
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages)
Form of item
online
Governing access note
Use of this electronic resource may be governed by a license agreement which restricts use to the European University Institute community. Each user is responsible for limiting use to individual, non-commercial purposes, without systematically downloading, distributing, or retaining substantial portions of information, provided that all copyright and other proprietary notices contained on the materials are retained. The use of software, including scripts, agents, or robots, is generally prohibited and may result in the loss of access to these resources for the entire European University Institute community
Isbn
9781107567092
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
digital, PDF file(s).
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)844940155

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