The Resource Bank regulation in a post-financial crisis landscape : essays of the interaction between financial institutions, Charlotte Werger

Bank regulation in a post-financial crisis landscape : essays of the interaction between financial institutions, Charlotte Werger

Label
Bank regulation in a post-financial crisis landscape : essays of the interaction between financial institutions
Title
Bank regulation in a post-financial crisis landscape
Title remainder
essays of the interaction between financial institutions
Statement of responsibility
Charlotte Werger
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This thesis is a nexus of three topics; financial stability, banking regulation and financial influence. In four separate chapters, this work examines how financial institutions interact with their regulators, in particular after the financial crisis of 2008. Size, incentives, guarantees, moral hazard, treatment, capture and influence play an important role in the analysis. The first chapter focusses on the relation between bank size and support, confirming the hypothesis that bank size is positively related to support ratings. It also finds evidence that the effect is non-linear, confirming the 'too-big-to-rescue' theory. Chapter two tests whether the expectation of individual and systemic government support induces moral hazard. It shows that banks tend to be more leveraged, funded with capital of lower quality, more heavily invested in risky assets and exposed to more severe liquidity mismatch when they are perceived as being more likely to benefit from government support. In the last two chapters the focus is shifted to banks' political activities and connections. Both chapters leverage a unique dataset that links U.S. banks' sources of influence (e.g., lobbying expenditures, proximity to the relevant legislative committee, prior affiliation with regulatory or government institutions) to bank financial data, actual bank supervisory actions, and market-inferred expected government support. The findings in chapter three suggest that banks' political influence indeed matters for the regulatory treatment of distressed banks, as well as for the expectation of support regardless of bank distress. Chapter four further dives into determinants of bank lobbying, and explores whether political connections and risk taking influence the decision to lobby. In combination, these findings are instructive for understanding the political landscape surrounding banks and their regulators. It also helps us to have a broader understanding of what drives government support to banks, and how in turn that support can trigger moral hazard within banks
Cataloging source
FIE
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Werger, Charlotte
Date time place
Defence date: 4 February 2016
Dissertation note
Thesis (Ph. D.)--European University Institute (ECO), 2016.
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
theses
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
European University Institute
Series statement
  • EUI PhD theses.
  • EUI theses
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Banks and banking
  • Banks and banking
  • Financial crises
  • Bank failures
Label
Bank regulation in a post-financial crisis landscape : essays of the interaction between financial institutions, Charlotte Werger
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/38904
Instantiates
Publication
Note
Examining Board: Professor Elena Carletti, Bocconi University and EUI, Supervisor; Professor Evi Pappa, EUI; Professor Luca Deidda, Universita' di Sassari; Professor Wilko Bolt, Dutch Central Bank
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (page 115)
Control code
FIEb17814200
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
124 pages
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)945784343
Label
Bank regulation in a post-financial crisis landscape : essays of the interaction between financial institutions, Charlotte Werger
Link
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/38904
Publication
Note
Examining Board: Professor Elena Carletti, Bocconi University and EUI, Supervisor; Professor Evi Pappa, EUI; Professor Luca Deidda, Universita' di Sassari; Professor Wilko Bolt, Dutch Central Bank
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (page 115)
Control code
FIEb17814200
Dimensions
30 cm.
Extent
124 pages
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(OCoLC)945784343

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